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Summary:
This report provides an assessment of the transition to a multi-pary system of government in
Zambia. The first section gives a general background to processes of democratisation in
Africa, while the subsequent ones deal specifically with the situation in Zambia, parcularly
the general elections held in October 1991. Special attention is devoted to the political context
of the election campaign and the domestie and international efforts in monitoring the elections,
as well as the role of donor agencies in that process. The elections are judged on balanee to
have be en free and fair despite some irregularties. A conc1uding section discusses prospects
for consolidating democratic procedures andpractices. Finally it offers some suggestions as
to how donors may support a further deepening of the democratisation process.
Sammendrag:
Denne rapporten gir en vurdering av overgangen til fler-partisystem i Zambia. Et innledende
kapittel inneholder en generell bakgrnn for demokratiseringsprosessene i Afrika, mens de
øvrge tar opp forholdene i Zambia spesifikt, særlig det allmenne valget i oktober l991.
Spesiell oppmerksomhet er viet den politiske situasjonen under valgkampen så vel som den
nasjonale og internasjonale valgovervåkingen, samt bistandsorganisasjonenes rolle i
overvåkingen. Valget blir vurdert å ha vært gjennomført stort sett frtt og rettferdig til tross
for enkelte uregelmessigheter. De avsluttende kapitlene drøfter utsiktene til å befeste
demokratiske prosedyrer og praksis. Dessuten fremmes noen forslag til hvordan
bistandsorganisasjoner kan støtte opp om den videre demokratiseringen.
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Executive summary
1. The purpose of this study is wider than a mere evaluation of the conduct
of the elections, and the processes that led to the introduction of multi-pary
democracy in Zambia after 18 years of continuous on e-p ar y rule. The main
objective is to assess the role of international donors, including international
observer teams, and to evaluate the potential for supporting democratic
processes and democratic elections elsewhere in countres receiving
Norwegian aid. This reflects an increasing interest on the part of Norwegian
donor circles to make more consistent and legitimate efforts in contrbuting
to the promotion of democratic principles and human rights through aid.
2. International monitoring of elections has become an important method
of external involvement in democratic processes, and there is an increasing
recognition of the role such monitoring can play in promoting human rights
in countries experiencing democratic elections. The main emphasis is often
put on formal democratic procedures, and respect for fundamental rights in
the election process itself. In order to assess whether an election is free and
fair one must also consider provisions of other human rights instruments,
such as the rights to hold opinions without harassment or victimisation,
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and freedom of association.
3. Furthermore, institutions that promote social and political parcipation
in an incipient pluralist political culture also need to be developed if
democracy is to be sustained and take root in formerly autocratic societies.
Under the new political dispensation it has become easier to accept
resources from the North in building democratic institutions and enhancing
a democratic political culture.
4. The linkage between development assistance and human
rights/democracy support involves ethical questions. Although the criteria
derive from international human rights law, any form of human rights
paternalism should be carefully avoided. Plans and priorities should be
worked out in continuing dialogue through which the desires and needs for
support are identified and suggested by the cooperating partners themselves.
Rather than building new dominant structures, the donor community should
aim at supporting existing democratic bodies and institutions in order to
promote viable democratic processes.
In the case of Zambia the rapid rise and success of the democratic
movement is explicable only against the backdrop of the country's
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disastrous economic situation, which was brought about by the ill conceived
economic policy of the Kaunda government, and the inefficiency,
wastefulness, and unaccountability of a bloated parastatal sector and
bureaucracy. The consequent loss of legitimacy and authority of the Kaunda
government amongst both urban and rural Zambians but also increasingly
in the eyes of the donor community, were pre-conditions for the ariculation
of demands for political reform. The broad political coalition the opposition
did manage to build in the Movement for Multi-Pary Democracy (MMD)
further helped push the Kaunda government into making concessions with
reg ard to its otherwise apparent disdain for democratic principles.
5. The.undemocratic nature of the Kaunda government manifested itself
particularly in the virtual amalgamation of pary and government, which
also extended to the "traditional" leadership of the chiefs. Both at national
and locallevels the party was inextrcably intertwined with the government
as reflected in appointments of party functionaries to government positions
and of chiefs to party posts. The effects of this "mariage between the pary
and the state" outlived the official end of the one-party state, and made
itself felt, for example, by the indiscriminate use of state funds and
resources by Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) during
the election campaign, and the extensive use of government facilities by
UNIP party functionaries. This and the dubious role of the chiefs as
steadfast supporters and also as parliamentar candidates for UNIP turned
into a contentious issue during the election campaign.
6. But before the election campaign gained momentum the adoption of
a new Constitution proved to be even more contentious. The 22-member
constitutional commission appointed by then President Kaunda in
September 1990 was boycotted by the main opposition pary on grounds
that it was biased towards UNIP in its composition. Later on its
recommendations were also largely rejected. After a meeting in July 1991
between the leaders of the main paries, Chiluba and Kaunda, a
substantially amended Constitution was finally adopted. Among the main
amendments were provisions requiring all cabinet members to be appointed
from the ranks of the members of Parliament; an increase in the number of
appointed members of Parliament from five to eight; the removal of a
provision creating a constitutional court, which had given the President
power to dec1are martial law; and a provision requiring the President to
consult with Parliament before declaring a state of emergency and
providing for the termination of state of emergency within seven days after
the election of a new President.
7. The election system in Zambia is based on majority (or more precisely
plurality) elections in single-member constituencies, with one round of
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elections and "first-past-the-post" as the guiding principles for electing
members of Parliament. Supervision of the electoral process is in the hands
of an Electoral Commission, appointed by the President. In the 1991
election the Commission was not only understaffed and underfunded, but
was also criticised for its lack of imparality and independence, parly
because the President had powers to remove its members. The
organisational shortcomings of the Commission became apparent in its role
as Delimitation Commission and in the inadequate training of its staff.
8. The registration of voters also caused confusion and criticism. New
registration of voters had taken place almost a year prior to the elections,
explicitly not for the elections but rather for the referendum, which was
subsequently abandoned. Many young voters and others who did not wish
to vote in the referendum were thus, in effect, disenfranchised. The
electoral rolls were also faulty, party due to the confusion created by the
ad hoc manner in which the delimitation of constituencies was made. Calls
on the Electoral Commission to allow voting with national registration
cards only were rejected, however, on grounds of possibilities for double
voting.
9. In the run-up to the elections Zambia was under a state of emergency,
which had been in force since 1964. Opposition parties, monitoring and
observer teams alike strongly deplored this fact and asserted that the state
of emergency was incompatible with the holding of free and fair elections.
Under mounting pressure Kaunda succumbed to this criticism. He was
adviced, however, by the Attorney General that according to the new
Constitution he was not authorised to lift the state of emergency without the
approval of Parliament which had already been dissolved. A heated debate
over the issue ensued, but the state of emergency remained in force. No
pary exploited this fact immediately prior to or during the elections, but it
must be assumed that it may have had an intimidating effect on the
electorate.
10. Incidents of intimidation, which were partly related to the state of
emergency, became known also during the election campaign. Although
both major parties, UNIP and MMD were the culprits, UNIP seems to have
had more means and inclinations to that effect. UNIP intimidation of MMD
members, both as threats and actual physical attacks, were reported from
the end of 1990 onwards. High ranking UNIP officiaIs, including the
President, were frequently reported to have threatened to "deal with the
opposition" after the elections. Only a few of such transgression's were
reported as coming from MMD. The deployment of paramilitary forces by
the then ruling party and reports of their brutality, furthermore, created a
feeling of living under siege. This was confirmed by UNIP's constant
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reference to the possibility of civil strife and brutal it y during and after the
elections, and allegations that MMD planned to take power by force.
Comparable allegations against UNIP by MMD were reported only in the
last phase of the campaign.
11. State-owned mass media were c1early found to favour the UNIP
government, and Kaunda himself publicly ordered media chiefs not to cover
the opposition. The emergence of newspapers of the opposition were
prevented by means of intimidation and denied access to printers,
advertisement etc. After considerable pressure from monitoring teams and
Zambian interest groups, the printed media sector improved with regard to
equity in coverage in the sec ond half of the campaign. The electronic media
remained highly biased until an injunction against its director-general
succeeded a month prior to the elections. For the L arg er par of the election
campaign the opposition parties were, however, greatly disadvantaged by
their limited access to the media.
12. The election campaign was in general not paying much attention to
political issues, and gender issues were accorded virtually no attention. The
two major parties fielded only very few female candidates and gender
issues gained little media coverage. Furthermore, the election monitoring
teams and internationalobservers expressed little interest in questions
pertaining to democratisation and gender. No electoral data disaggregated
by gender are available.
13. The Zambian elections proved to be exemplary with regards to
election monitoring and observation. Over 6000 local monitors and over
200 internationalobservers were present at virtually every polling station
of the countr, preventing any serious attempts of rigging. The process
leading up to this successful exercise was, however, more problematic and
contentious. Amongst the factors involved were the establishment of the
erstwhile sole local monitoring team, the Zambia Independent Monitoring
Team (ZIMT), and the role of the international Carter CenterlNDI (Z-Vote)
team. The latter assumed an overall responsibility for its own as well as for
local monitoring activities. Allegations of pariality and insensitivity, and
financial misunderstandings led to a split of the local monitoring team and
the formation of the Zambian Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee
(ZEMCC). At one time this split threatened the viability of the whole
exercise. The precarious nature of the democratic process at that juncture
contributed to exacerbating the problems just as much as did the very
dubious, and at times hostile, position of UNIP against the monitoring and
observation exercise. The difficulties encountered put in question the
position of local monitors within their own environment and the role of
internationalobservers and donors in this sensitive arena. Eventually ,
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however, both local monitoring teams, in tandem with international
observers, made invaluable contrbutions to ensuring the process of
elections as free and fair.
14. The contrbutions of the donor community to the Zambian
democratisation process seem to indicate that the election process itself, that
is, the Electoral Commission and national and international observers, were
the principal beneficiaries of donor support. It appears that Z- V ote did not
only receive disproportionately more funds, but was also commissioned to
channeI a major proportion of foreign donor support to local monitors. This
concentration of funds and the conditionality applied to their disbursement
appear to have exacerbated inherent problems.
15. The elections were unanimously declared as having been conducted
in a free and fair manner. A number of worries were expressed, however,
with regards to the fairness of the election campaign. The state of
emergency, the concomitant deployment of paramilitary troops, the bias of
the mass media, the misuse of state funds by UNIP, and the incidents of
intimidation and bribery, all throw serious doubts on the free and fair nature
of the election campaign. Such doubts do not pertain to the actual elections;
they were conducted in an atmosphere of solemnity and good will, in shar
contrast to the pre-election mood. Irregularties during the election
campaign were by allobservers attributed to organisational and logistical
inadequacies.
16. The turnout rate of 45 per cent of registered voters was unexpectedly
low. This is possibly due both to the faulty electoral rolls and the
disenfranchisement of many voters, and the fears of civil strife created
before the elections. The results of the elections were nonetheless clear:
MMD swept the polIs and won 74.7 per cent of the valid votes cast and
gained 126 seats in Parliament. UNIP gained only 24 seats, of which 19
were from Eastern Province. However, in view of the low turnout MMD
garnered the active electoral support of only 28 per cent of the total
estimated eligible voters.
17. After the elections, democratic principles must now take root within
society. There will in the future be a need for support to institutions for
safeguarding these principles. The fortcoming local government elections,
the continued independence of the mass media, and the promotion of
gender equality are in this process as important as is the fair treatment of
former UNIP appointees, who are now apparently victimised in a purge.
18. The most critical prerequisite for the conduct of free and fair
elections in any country is the effective functioning of an authoritative
Electoral Commission with adequate resources at its disposaL. Donors may
play a supporti ve role in providing resources for election materials such as
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printing of ballots, supplying ballot boxes and vehicles etc. The incumbent
government should not be allowed to be in a position to use shortage of
funds as a pretext for not equipping the Electoral Commission with
resources adequate for the discharge of its duties.
19. It is of crucial importance for the effectiveness of local monitoring
teams that donor funds are committed and released at an early date 80 as
to allow time for proper organisation of logistics and networks.
International observer teams also have a critical role to play,
complementar to that of the local monitors. It is of the utmost importance
that both international and local monitoring teams are unanimous in their
final judgement of elections as free and fair.
20. It is of paramount importance that great care be taken to compose
balanced teams against which no allegations of pariality may be justifiably
made lest the entire monitoring exercise be brought into question. The
monitorìng teams did a tremendous job in recording the amount of time
accorded the main contending paries on TV, the English news broadcasts
on radio and the space devoted to them in the printed media. However, no
corresponding monitoring was made of radio transmissions in vernacular
languages. In the future funds should be made available for local
monitoring teams to undertake comprehensive monitoring of radio
broadcasts, particularly those made in vernacular languages.
21. A workable democratic system of government is not established once
and for all by way of multi-pary elections. Such a step is just the first one.
A relapse back into authoritarianism is a distinct possibility if care is not
taken to safeguard the first democratic moves. It is evident that considerable
capabilities for monitoring exist within Zambia. But there is a case for
involving monitors from neighbouring countries in Southern Africa or the
African continent at large.
22. Donors should look further towards additional forms of support which
may help deepen the understanding of the democratisation process and help
nurture and entrench a democratic political culture. That would be the best
"vaccination" or "insurance" against a reversion to the pre-election malaise.
But requests for long-term institution-building projects should be appraised
very carefully in terms of their potential for long-term viability when donor
support has to be phased out. It may be better to bank on already existing
institutions where some infrastructure and competence can be found and be
bu ilt on, e.g. departments of political science at universities. They may be
supported in financial terms or through technical assistance from individuals
and institutions in the North with proven competence in this particular field.
In Norway the principal institutions are the Institute of Social Research
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(ISF) in Oslo and the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) in
Bergen.
23. In donor circles and elsewhere there has been a tendency towards
neglecting the practice of democracy as reflected in the inadequate attention
being paid to civil society. Generally , civil society is understood as a
separate sphere of human relations and activity, differentiated from the
state. Activities within the sphere of civil society may be considered a
democratic school where a democratic culture is being nurtured, without
which the democratic institutions run the risk of becoming a mere sham.
One should see democracy essentially as a method to arrive at legitimate
decisions. It is more of a continuous process than a strcture. Calling and
chairing meetings, debating, voting on resolutions and arving at decisions
to be implemented - all of which being elements of a democratic process.
It is a practical school for learning the democratic "rules of the game".
Donors should, as part of their commitment to democratisation~ consider
renewed support for civil society differently from previous practice.
Recipient organisations may not necessarily run a "development project" in
the conventional sense; they could be chess clubs for that matter.
24. To take on board such a task would mean a new challenge of some
magnitude and duration. Output would be difficult to measure in terms of
conventional yardsticks, but democracy cannot always be reduced to
tangible results, measurable in terms of money, kilometers of roads, tons
or kilowatts.
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1. Development aid and democratisation
proeesses in Africa
1.1 Introduction
Recent political changes in Africa have been more profound than ever since
independence was won three decades ago. The elections in Zambia were an
important illustration of upheavals on the African continent which will have
a significant impact on development co-operation and the political context
in which aid policies and programmes are carred out. The Zambian
elections have "set a standard" for peaceful transition to multi-party
competitive democracy, and a swift and orderly transfer of government.
Equally important was the fair and free conduct of the elections, although
preparations for the elections were not without serious flaws, and the
election campaign was not free from political manipulation, examples of
intimidation and incidents of politically motivated harassment.
The purpose of this study is, however, to evaluate only partially the
conduct of the elections, and the processes that led to the introduction of
multi-party democracy in Zambia after 18 years of continuous one-pary
rule. The main objective of the study is to assess the role of international
donors, including international observer teams, and to evaluate the potential
for supporting democratic processes and democratic elections in countries
receiving Norwegian aid. This reflects an increasing interest on the par of
Norwegian donor circ1es to make more consistent and legitimate efforts of
contributing to the promotion of democratic principles and human rights
through aid. This area of interest is, however, a relatively new policy field.
Consequently, it has been recognised that more insight and knowledge is
needed about ways and means by which development aid policies may
positively contribute to democratic elections in paricular, and more
generally to long-term processes aimed at good governance and genuinely
democratic systems. In principle, it also requires more systematic research
and knowledge about the social, economic and cultural preconditions for
the functioning and survival of liberal democracy in Africa. Significant as
it may be for aid policies, however, it does not fall within the scope of the
present study to address this wider issue.
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Members of the team putting together this report also acted as
internationalobservers during the elections. More than 200 international
observers were present. Although international election observation has
gained increasing interest over the last years, Zambia marks the first case
in which an African state with an internationally recognised government,
and not facing an internal conflict (as in Uganda in 1980), has welcomed
internationalobservers. Experiences drawn from this exercise and
observations made about the interplay of internationalobservers and the
two domestic monitoring teams (with more than 6,000 volunteers) is
discussed at some length in chapter 4 of the report.
In addressing the main issue of the report: "how may development
assistance contribute to democratic elections and transitions to democracy
in Africa" - the approach chosen has been to review the elections in a
broader political, cultural and economic context. This has been done, in
spite of the very tight time constraints under which the study, including a
short fact-finding mission to Zambia, was cared out.
1.2 Background: The quest for multi..party democracy in
Africa
The winds of democracy that have been sweeping across the African
continent in recent years have produced dramatic and historically
remarkable results thus far. As late as in early 1990 as many as 37 out of
53 Afrcan states had one-party systems of government or military regimes,
while only 14 could be classified as multi-party democracies.1 When
Zambia joined the growing number of countres introducing multi-pary
political systems, the pro-democracy movement had become a potent
political force in a majority of the remaining countres with one-pary
systems or militar rule. In 1990 and 1991 intemal opposition groups
protested against economic hardship and political repression, and exerted
political pressure for political reform and compelled the governments of at
least 19 states to announce or adopt significant reforms. In the period from
March 1990 to May 1991, democratic elections were held for the first time
in the Comoro Islands (March 1990), Gabon (September-October 1990),
The Weekly Review, 8 November 1991, p. 35. Reliable c1assifications of this kind are not
easily available and those which exist do differ. Michael Bratton suggests 9 multi-pary
democracies prior to the elections in October 1991 in Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire. The
Economist of 22 Februar 1992 (p. 20) inc1udes a table showing IL countries to have
held "contested elections" in the past five years (and 12 more are likely to be held
"soon").
2
Cote dIvoire (October-November 1990), Sao Tomé and Principe (October-
November 1990), Cape Verde (Januar-Februar 1991), and Benin
(February-March 1991). A number of other countres are scheduled to hold
multi-party elections in 1992, including Algeria (January 1992), and
Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique and
Zaire by the end of the year.
Although incipient since the mid-1980's the recent democratic reform
processes in Afrca accelerated after the collapse of the former Communist
regimes of Western and Central Europe in 1989-90. This process marked
the collapse of the ideology and legitimacy of the one:-party state. The
process also created a fear that the events in Eastern and Central Europe
would relegate Africa to an even more marginal role globally: If the
Afrcan continent was still was to receive development aid from the West
in competition with the emerging democracies in Eastern and Central
Europe, Africa was in ne ed of political reforms along the same lines as
those of Eastern and Central Europe. On the other hand, economic crises,
mismanagement and corruption, as in Zambia, often compounded by
political repression and personalised rule, as in Kenya, spurred citizens to
take to the streets and demand political reform and multi-pary democracy.
The internal quest for change has been strong and genuine, although
articulated predominantly by the urban elites. In arecent issue Africa
Confidential stresses that in spite of nominal and in many cases
constitutional changes in the political system, the new politicalleadership
do es frequently not represent a break with the past: "The new powerholders
come, by and large from the same political dass and even the same
families as those who were dose to the centre of power in the previous
three decades. In country after country, the new opposi tion leaders or the
victorious democratic politicians are often none other than people who
served the single party long and faithfully without any great signs of a
crisis of conscience. Some of the most successful new-breed politicians are
simply old-breed politicians who choose the right moment to break with the
past and engage in the new watch-words of good governance and respect
for human rights.,,2
This concern about the ex tent of political equality, recruitment of
political leadership, popular participation and, in the last instance,
accountability and representative government, raises topical issues with
regard to the transition to democracy and its consolidation in Zambia as
well as in other emerging democracies in Africa. Crucial as they are,
democracy is certainly not only about rights to signify preferences and
2 Africa Confidential, January 10, 1992.
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interests through voting in democratic elections. For a political system to
be genuinely democratic the political process must change towards greater
popular paricipation at alllevels.3 Hence, democratic govemance must be
open, accountable and paricipatory, and requires a set of juridically
protected political and civil rights to development and sustenance.
Particularly important among these rights and freedoms are the freedom of
speech, an independent press, freedom of association, access to state
information, in particular about development plans and strategies for those
directly affected4, and freedom from discrimination on grounds of sex,
nationality or social origin, political opinion, etc.
Processes of transition from one-pary authoritaran rule to multi-party
democracy raise specific problems and challengesas to the democratic
nature of the process. One issue is the recruitment of the new leadership,
as pointed out in the article in A/rica Confidential quoted above. Does the
new leadership, if elections are successfully contested, represent and create
a new and democratic political culture? Are all those parties interested in
taking part in the election process permitted to participate? Do access to
resources or political restrictions bar any part of the opposition from
paricipating? How inclusive is the process in terms of women? Are
minority interests addressed and represented? Yet another issue is the
functioning of the internal decision-making procedures of political parti es,
including procedures for the nomination of candidates.
The success of the democratic opposition to remain united and
consolidated during processes of transition is crucial for peaceful political
change to occur. However, the formation of broad opposition coalitions
may have the effect that crucial, but potentially divisive political, economic
and social issues, are disregarded or ignored - deliberately or not. In the
Zambian election campaign the lack of issue politics was striking to outside
observers, but apparently important in order to address effectively the main
issue, namely the transition to a democratic political system. The debates
of the election campaign were mainly manifestations of concem about
compliance and alleged non-compliance with the democratic procedures and
the transition to multi-pary politics itself.
As a reference point for observing elections the present authors consulted
a set of observation guidelines which spelled out the basic principles for
3 Cf. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition (New Heaven and London:
Yale University Press, 1971), for a c1assic examination of the concept of democracy (or
"polyarchy") and conditions for democratisation and liberalisation of political regimes.
4 Cf. John Clark, Democratizing Development. The Role of Voluntary Organizations,
Earhscan Publications Ltd, London, 1991, p. 16f.
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democratic election processes.5 The main emphasis of these guidelines is
on the formal democratic procedures, and respect for fundamental human
rìghts in the election process. Attempts were also made to assess these
procedures in a proper context of the political, economic and social
environments of the elections (cf. chapter 2). We believe that this approach
is required if conclusions are to be drawn not merely about the actual
conduct of the elections in question. It will also facilitate the drawing of
conclusions about how the democratic process initiated by these elections
may be developed further and strengthened through institutions,
empowerment of the citizenr and paricipatory processes.
The issue ofrepresentativeness of the politicalleadership, and recruitment
systems in politics is an area in need of systematic empirical research and
analysis in Zambia, including regional representation and recruitment of
women to political posts and leadership (cf. section 3.4). A related issue is
the articulation of rural interests and the relationships emerging between
urban are as and their political elites on the one hand and the rural areas on
the other. In this context, institutions promoting social and political
paricipation in a plural political culture ne ed to be developed if democracy
is to be sustained and take root in Zambian society.
The recent political changes in Africa, and more specifically in Zambia,
indicate that promotion of human rights and democracy is less a matter of
principle than of resources. Under the new political dispensation it has
become easier to accept resources from the North in building democratic
institutions and enhancing a democratic culture. In so do ing donors should
avoid any form of human rights patemalism without compromising on
standards of effective use of funds. Rather than building new dominant
structures, existing democratic bodies and institutions should be supported,
and cooperative schemes encouraged. Above all, the prime objective should
be to support and sustain democratic processes, competence-building and
establishment of viable institutions.
1.3 Political conditionality and the international right to
intervene
Most of the one-party states in Africa have collapsed under a combination
of intern al and external pressures. Since the beginning of 1990 external
pressure has increasingly been exerted though varing degrees of political
5 Cf. Guidelines for International Election Observing, The International Human Rights
Law Group, Washington, 1984.
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c onditi onali t y attached to aid packages, c1aiming that political reforms,
democratisation and human rights observance be considered a condition for
continued transfer of aid. For instance, in 1991 the World Bank suggested
that reducing militar expenditure should be considered as a condition for
making loans to those developing countres that are "overspending" on the
militar at the expense of investing in people.6 More recently, the Donor
Consortium on Kenya, which met in Pars in November 1991, decided to
suspend all new aid to Kenya for six months in order to put pressure on the
Kenya government to introduce democratic reforms and address the
problem of public accountability and corrption.
International obsetvation of elections has increasingly become an
important method of external involvement in democratic processes. There
is today an unqualified recognition of the role election observation missions
can play in promoting human rights in countries going through democratic
transitions.7 Yet, the inter-governmental community (Le. the UN) has only
reluctantly accepted the conclusion that the recognition and free exercise of
democratic rights (the right to vote in free and fair elections) is a
prerequisite for the recognition of the will of the people as the basis for
governance. In December 1990 the General Assembly adopted two
resolutions, of which the first affirmed "that the authority to govern shall
be based on the will of the people, as expressed in periodic and genuine
elections".8 The other resolution, in apparent contradiction to the previous
one, contended that the prohibition of intervening into intern al affairs be
upheld, stating that "any extraneous activities that attempt, directly or
indirectly, to interfere in the free development of national electoral
processes, particularly in developing countries" constituted a violation of
the United Nation's Charter. It appealed to states "to refrain from financing
or providing, directly or indirectly any form of overt or covert support for
political paries or groups".9 This probably reflects an apprehension or a
6 Cf. Prowse, M. "World Ban report advocates market liberalisation and cuts in military
expenditure. Prospects for Third World brighten", Financial Times, 8 July, 1991.
7 Cf. footnote 5.
8 Cf. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 45/150 of 18 December 1990 on
"Enhancing the effectiveness of the pnnciple of periodic and genuine elections".
9 Cf. General Assembly Resolution 45/151 of 18 December 1990 on "Respect for
principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States
in their electoral processes", paras 3 and 5. Norway together with the governents of
Australia, Au stria, Belgium, Bulgara, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and the
United States voted against the resolution. Quoted from Katarna Tomasevski
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concern on the part of a number of governments, paricularly in the Third
World, that the principle of non-interference would be eroded and the way
be paved for legitimizing undue intervention. Increasingly, however,
international election observation missions are appraised as being crucial to
internal and international respect for and legitimacy of election results.
Therefore, they are requested by the opposition and welcomed, or at least
tolerated, by the regime in power.
It should also be recognised that the work of an election observer mission
is not limited to voting rights. In order to assess whether an election is free
and fair it must also consider provisions of the other human rights
instruments, such as the rights to hold opinions without harassment or
victimisation, to freedom of expression, to peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association. The conduct of the election campaign, and in
particular incidents of intimidation and harassment, should be carefully
identified and observed. Thus in addition to promoting a fraud-free election,
an election observation mission may also contrbute to the improvement of
the overall human rights situation in the country during the process of
transition.
In Zambia, the government initially refused admission of international
election monitoring teams to observe the October 1991 elections. In the
course of the reform process, however, President Kaunda made astatement
to the effect that international observation teams were welcome after all (cf.
section 2.2).
1.4 Development aid in emerging democracies
Directly and indirectly the democratisation process may have significant
impacts on the political and social context of development aid cooperation,
and the orientation and nature of aid. In a democratic society, public
policies and policy-making require the free articulation and open debate on
any issue, including transfers of development aid, its role in society,
priorities, its distribution among social groups and geographic regions, and
the ways and structures through which it is channelled. At the same time,
democratisation of aid practices may make decision-making in the context
of aid cooperation more cumbersome and conflict-prone. For instance, a
"Development Cooperation and democratization: Past experiences, recent changes", in
Catarna Krause and Allan Rosas (eds.), Development Co-operation and Processes
Towards Democracy, Helsinki, 1991, Proceedings from the Nordie Seminar on
Development Cooperation and Proeesses Towards Democracy, Hanasaar, Espoo,
Finland, 21-22 October 1991, p. 4.
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free press in an open society will certainly take an interest in the functions,
implementation and the social and cultural effects of aid projects and
programmes.
The linkage of aid and human rights/democracy support has puniti ve and
promotional aspects. When reviewing the main objectives of Norwegian
development cooperation in 1984 (Parliamentar White Paper no. 36 (1984-
85)), the Norwegian Governent adopted a model for how to respond to
violations of human rights, and envisaged "modification, reduction or
cessation of Norwegian assistance ... when the government of a recipient
country takes part in, tolerates or directly executes violations of human
rights". The model, basically takng a punitive approach, also determined
that human rights violations which were "persistent and systematic", and/or
"gross and systematic" without any serious effort on the par of the
government to end the abuses would bring about a reconsideration of
development assistance. The most important means of modification of aid
in cases of gross human rights violations included re-channelling of aid
from inter-governmental cooperation to the NGO sector.
What was basically lacking (albeit briefly referred to) in this policy
response model was the promotion al dimension of the human
rights/democracy and aid linkage. Among the lessons drawn from our
studies of the Zambian elections, including interviews with development aid
personneI in NORAD, a number of ways, channels and levels may be
identified by which human rights and democratic processes may be
supported, including financial and other kinds of support for democratic
elections and consolidation of the democratic system. Most of these
proposals do not only apply in situations of rapid democratisation, although
most of them will more easily be implemented in countries which explicitly
aim at enhancing human rights by their own efforts and through
international cooperation.
A basic premise underlying the rationale for strengthening the linkage of
humanrights to foreign aid is that human rights promotion begins at home.
Credibility in promoting human rights and democracy through aid requires
that Norway's own human rights record is impeccable. More specifically
related to aid policies it requires, furthermore, that the Norwegian
development aid system has the administrative c ap aci t y, and legal and
technical skills and training to implement human rights and democratic
principles in aid efforts. At the micro level this requires training of experts
and administrative personneI, improving reporting procedures and
information handling within the NORAD system, and increasing election
research and monitoring capacity in Norway as well as in partner countries.
At the meso and macro leveIs, it includes the strengthening of the
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dialogue with recipient govemments, and the "multilogue" between
Norwegian NGOs and their counterpars in partner countres. It also
includes strengthening the human rights component in bilateral agreements;
encouraging parner countries to ratify international human rights
instruments, and supporting the implementation of the provisions of such
instruments, e.g. reporting commitments. Furthermore, a promotional human
rights policy should aim at supporting institution-building and capacity-
bu ilding of local NGOs; strengthening the court system and the
independence of the judiciary; establishment of ombudsman systems (in
defense of women's rights and non-discrimination; the rights of the child
etc.). Financial support may also be provided for preparation and
implementation of national and local government elections including
independent election monitoring, promotion of pluralist mass media at
national and local leveIs, and strengthening of communication processes
and information gathering about public attitudes and opinion through
research and opinion polIs. Several of these forms of support, adapted, to
the Zambian context, will be returned to in more detail in chapter 8.
It should be noted that the linkage between development assistance and
human rights/democracy support involves ethical questions. Although the
criteria derive from international human rights law, any form of human
rights paternalism should be carefully avoided. Plans and priorities should
be worked out in a continuous dialogue through which the desires and
needs for support are identified and suggested by the cooperating partners
themselves. One of the main conclusion that may be drawn from the
present study is that the dialogue may be further developed and
substantially strengthened when Norway's cooperating parners introduce
political reforms and democratic systems of govemance.
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2. The political, economic and cultural
environment of the elections
2.1 The economy
The Zambian economy has be en deteriorating rapidly over the last 15 years,
up to a point where the countr, one of the richest in Afrca at
independence in 1964, has ended up as one of the poorest and most heavily
indebted ones, not only in Afrca, but in the world. According to the World
Bank Zambia's per capita GNP at US$ 390 in 1989 had fallen by 2 per
cent since 1965, while the GDP had risen by only 0.8 per cent in the last
decade. Concomitantly Zambia's external debt had in 1989 reached US$
6,874 million, some 159 per cent of its GNP at that time, which in per
capita terms was higher than that of BraziL.1
The reliance the Kaunda government had placed on the copper industr,
the major export eamer, and the consistent reluctance to diversify the
economy have to a large degree been responsible for the economic disaster.
But the inefficiency and wastefulness of a large parastatal sector, which
dominated the economy, and the overinflated bureaucracy that went with
it, contributed as much to Zambia's economic quagmire as did the
corrption and unaccountability of the Kaunda government.
One of the most prominent failures of the Zambian government to date
has been the consistent neglect of the agricultural sector which, although
it has been recognised as Zambia's greatest potential export earer, has
remained sadly underdeveloped. With half of its population living in urban
areas, Zambia is heavily dependent on its farers to produce the countr's
staple, maize. But the state-controlled agricultural pricing and marketing
system was biased in favour of the consumers rather than the producers.
The heavy subsidisation of the maize sector never benefited the small
peasants, who towards the end of the last decade had emerged as the major
producers of that crop. The notorious inefficiency of the parastatal
marketing agencies which regularly found its expression in vast losses of
maize, because it was rotting uncollected or was smuggled into
l World Ban, World Development Report, 1991. The Challenge of Development,
Washington D.e., 1991, pp. 204, 206, 244, and 250.
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neighbouring countries, aggravated the situation. By the end of 1991 maize
subsidies cost the country some US$ 50,000 a day, and dwindling maize
reserves forced the country to import the crop at the cost of at least US$
90 million.2
There was, however, no lack of strctural adjustment programmes, both
under IMF/W orld Bank conditions and of the home-made indìgenous
variant, but these too fell prey to economic mismanagement and political
opportunism. In 1987, for example, Zambia abandoned an IMF adjustment
package after urban riots had broken out against the withdrawal of maize
meal subsidies. In 1991, after an unsuccessful "home-made" adjustmeot
programme and a new agreement with the IMF, the Kaunda government
failed again to implement the austerity measures agreed upon. The reasons
were political, since the forthcoming elections were close. This time,
however, the IMF and major donors unilaterally suspended their
programmes in Zambia.
By then the mood of the people had also changed. During the latest
strctural adjustment programme, and the inadequate political and economic
handling of it, Zambia's already high incidence of poverty and poverty-
related symptoms manifested themselves further. As almost always in
structural adjustment programmes the urban population was most seriously
hit, but the situation of the rural population also deteriorated dramatically.
Moreover, unlike the popular protest in 1986, which the government could
to a certain degree divert by blaming the IMF, the popular protest that
erupted in 1990 was clearly directed against the Kaunda government. The
cheering crowds who celebrated the coup attempt shortly after the first riots
in June 1990 left little doubt about the mood of the urban population. But
political discontent also spread to rural areas where small-scale farers
were unable to make ends meet, and where the partial liberalisation of
agricultural marketing had further emphasised the inability of the
governent to deal with the situation.
The movement for multi-party democracy grew out of Zambia's
disastrous economic situation and the inability as well as the unwillingness
of, first, the urban groups, then also the rural population to cope any longer.
After the urban unrests in 1990 the movement increasingly gained political
momentum. Its rapid rise and success can only be understood against the
backdrop of severe economic decline and mismanagement and the
discontent it created not only among the majority of Zambians but
eventually also in the donor community.
2 The Economist, 5.10.1991; Business Day, 13.10.1991.
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2.2 The multi..party debate and the quest for political change
After the last general elections in October 1988, held under the one-pary
strcture, the government introduced wide-ranging economic reforms which
included the devaluation of the K wacha (November 1988), the reduction of
maize subsidies, removal of price controIs, raising of interest rates and a
second devaluation in 1989. In contrast to the public outcry in 1986 and
1987 (inc1uding strikes and serìous political turmoil) when maize meal
subsidies were removed, public protest this time was more moderate, but
unrest still ensued in the form of riots on the Copperbelt, a wave of strikes,
and protests at the university. The Governent, on its par, reacted with the
use of teargas against rioters and by closing the university. In the second
half of 1989, and early 1990, however, stres continued to occur
occasionally, although serious popular opposition appeared to have been
effectively suppressed by determined government action. Nevertheless,
discontent and opposition continued to simmer below the surface.
From March 1990 onwards, events stared to change the direction of
Zambian politics towards fundamental change which ultimately led to the
reintroduction of multi-pary politics and the democratic elections in
October 1991. The turning point came with UNIP's call for a National
Convention of the party in March 1990 in order to discuss democratisation
of the political system in respons e to political changes in other pars of the
world.3 UNIP's critics among businesspeople, trade unions and political
circles, inspired by the transformations towards democracy in Eastern and
Central Europe, as well as in other African countries, resurfaced and
proposed a return to multi-party politics. Government critics maintained
that "the party had usurped too much power", and one delegate to the
Convention, Arthur Wina, the country's first Minister of Finance, suggested
that the supremacy of the pary' s central committee and its organs over all
other political institutions should be removed: "I propose that UNIP rev erts
to its original status as a political party which depends solelyon its
supporters and sympathisers for its support and from its investments, party
subscriptions and donations for funding and for material apparatus to cary
out its functions as a party.,,4 One-pary rule, he maintained, had "denied
every common man and women their full rights of citizenship and has left
the common man without legal constitutional rights except those which he
enjoys under the discretion of the party".5 Wina together with other former
3 New African, May 1990, p. 20.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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leaders such as former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vernon Mwaanga and
former Prime Minister Daniel Lisulo, made calls for the reintroductionof
multi-party democracy. In another paper to the Convention, Mwaanga and
another former Minister, Alexander Chikwanda, urged the government to
lift the state of emergency which had been in force since 1964, and
criticised the government for lack of consultation in economic decision-
making.
The Convention adopted a resolution recommending the lifting of the
state of emergency.6 The quest for the reintroduction of a multi-pary
democracy, however, was unanimously rejected. But in spite of the
rejection, the issue continued to attract attention, and the political proeess
towards reform accelerated. In May 1990 President Kaunda accepted to put
the issue to a national referendum.
This proposal was endorsed by the Central and National Committees of
UNIP in the same month. Kaunda immediately started to campaign against
the reintroduction of multi-pary democracy. Claiming that "tribal feelings
are still too strong in Zambia", the President made all efforts to control the
issue from the outset. A vociferous campaign defending UNIP and the one-
pary state was launched.7 However, in June 1990 two incidents helped
snap the initiativ e out of the hands of Kaunda and the party. In the last
week of June, the government, acting on the advice of the World Bank,
announced a 100 per cent increase in maize meal prices. This
announcement triggered off unprecedented political unrest. From Lusaka
riots and looting spread to other urban centres. When the government had
succeeded in suppressing the violence, it was officially stated that 27
people had been killed, hundreds seriously injured and more than 1,000
arrested.8 The dust had hardly settled before, on June 30, a handful of
junior soldiers attempted a coup d' etat. Thousands of Zambians took to the
streets of Lusaka to celebrate the apparent overtow of Kaunda's
government.
The popular jubilation certainly weakened the position of the President
further. Kaunda, however, responded to the events by reaffirming his
commitment to the referendum, scheduled for 17 October. As a political
concession he released 44 political prisoners. At the same time, Kaunda
continued to make allegations that multi-pary politics would breed "chaos,
bloodshed and death" and labelled multi-pary advocates as "misfits,
6 The recommendation was later rejected by the National Council of UNIP, the pary's
most powerful body.
7 Economist Intellgenee Unit, Zambia Country Profile : 1991-92, p. 6.
8 Africa Confidentìal, VoL. 31 No. 15, 27 July 1991, p. 1.
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malcontents, drug-peddlers and dissidents".9 At this time it became c1ear
that the church and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) intended
to campaign in favour of a multi-pary system. In order to secure just and
fair play, the ZCTU, orchestrated by representativ es of the Catholic church,
insisted on the presence of international observers, lifting of the state of
emergency, equal media time for advocates of a multi-pary systems and
defenders of status quo, and no intimidation during the campaign.10
In July 1990, the multi-pary advocates began to organise themselves and
to mobilise the public. On 17 July, the l7-year old ban on the right to
organise opposition groups was lifted and four days later the Movement for
Multi-Pary Democracy (MMD) was founded as an umbrella organisation
by members from the business community, the church, the students, trade
unionists and former politicians. The ban on political paries, however, was
still in place in terms of article 4 of the Constitution. During the subsequent
month the repeal of this article became one of the main political issues.
The former UNIP politician Arthur Wina was elected chairman of the
executive body of MMD, the National Interim Committee, and the former
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vernon M waanga, and the chairman of ZCTU,
Frederick Chiluba, were elected vice chairmen. A week later, on 25 July,
Kaunda postponed the referendum until August 1991, allegedly to allow
registration of voters, but more likely it was an attempt to regain the
political initiative.
The multi-party campaign intensified in August and September. While
MMD rallies gathered tens of thousands (some observers say hundreds of
thousands) of supporters, UNIP rallies were reported to have a very low
turn-out. In an unexpected move, but after much pressure from the multi-
pary lobby, Kaunda at an extra-ordinar National Council meeting of
UNIP on 24 September cancelled the earlier proposed referendum in favour
of a direct move to multi-pary elections due to be held in October 1991.
"Lets take them at the polIs" he dec1ared to 600 party delegates at the
Council meeting. The official explanation given for this unexpected move
was that the referendum campaign was expensive and was likely to divide
the nation. More realistically the move should be interpreted as another
tactical manoeuvre attempting to control the nature and form of the political
process. Another point to be added is the release of the report of the
referendum commission chaired by Justice Mathew Ngulube. While Kaunda
expected the Commission to make recommendations favouring the
governments advocacy of the one-pary state, e.g. by restricting the
9 lbid., p. 2.
10 Ibid.
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opposition's access to the media, the Commission recommended the
opposite. In general, observers of Zambian politics interpreted the report as
a shock to Kaunda, and as a proof of his declining authority.ll By the
same token, officials within UNIP expressed disagreement about Kaunda's
idea of having a referendum, and suggested that a straight and early switch
into multi-paryism might have been in the interest of UNIP. In the words
of one UNIP official: "Jf we had immediately asked them to form pares,
several paries would have emerged and ths would have be en easy meat for
us. ,,12
Shortly after the cancellation of the referendum, Kaunda appointed a
Commission to recommend necessar amendments to the Constitution,
chaired by the Solicitor General, Patrck Mvunga. The work of the
Commission became the basis for the new Constitution which was to be
tabled before Parliament on 24 August 1991 (cf. section 3.1). On 4
December 1990, Parliament removed aricle 4 of the 1973 Constitution
which enshrined the one-pary state and made UNIP the sole legal pary.
This constitutional reform marked the end of the one-pary period in
Zambia. MMD and nine other parties registered, the majority of which
being highly personalised and marginal endeavours.13
The quest for a multi-pary system in Zambia was basically linked to the
loss of legitimacy and authority of the UNIP government and President
Kaunda. It was primarily supported by business circles, trade unionists, the
Catholic church, the students and academics, and prominent lawyers. The
ability to form a political coalition among these highly diverse groupings
11 Africa Confidential, VoL. 31 No. 16, 1990, p. 2.
12 New African, December 1990, p. 16.
13 According to the Registrar of Societies, 12 paries had applied for registration by
October 1991, but only seven had met the requirements for registration. (Cf. Presidential
and National Assembly Elections in Zambia. 31 October 1991, London, the Report of
the Commonwealth Observer Group, the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1992, p. 1.).
According to Southern Africa, VoL. 5, No. 1, 1991 (pp. 22-24) candidates from six
paries were contesting in the parliamentary elections, but most of the paries apart from
UNIP and MMD, had candidates contesting in a lImited number of constituencies only:
The Democratie Socialist Pary (DSP) was launching one candidate, the Social
Democratie Party (SDP) had 10 candidates, the National Democratie Allanee (NADA)
had 19 candidates and the National Democratic Pary (NDP) presented 52 candidates.
The other paries registered inc1uded the Christian Allanee for the Kingdom of Africa
(CHAKA), JAC Democratically Debating Party (JADEPA), Multi Racial Pary (MRP),
People's Organization (PO), and the Theocracy Spiritual Party (TSP).
In the Presidential election UNIP and MMD were the only parties fielding a candidate.
These two paries also had candidates running in each of the 150 constituencies in the
National Assembly elections.
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helps explain the success of the movement in bringing about a fundamental
change in the political system. Though the willingness of Kaunda to make
political concessions during the process should be commended, one may
doubt whether other options realistically existed. The declining authority of
the government in dealing with the international donor community, and the
donors ' Jack of confidence in UNIP' s willingness and capability in
restrcturing the economy, was indirectly supportive of the domestic
movement for political reforms. The US Government' s decision to cancel
a USD 250 million debt to Zambia only two days after Frederick Chiluba
had been elected chairman of MMD on 1 March, illustrates this point very
weii.14
It is evident that MMD must be seen as the driving force and the catalyst
of the introduction of multi-pary democracy in Zambia. Early in the
process of transition, MMD was able to compel the UNIP government into
accepting the holding of a referendum on the multi-pary issue, which was
later substituted by the multi-party election in October 1991. During
church-sponsored consultative talks between the leadership of UNIP and
MMD, the latter was able to push through significant amendments to the
new constitution, thereby introducing important checks and balances within
the political structure (cf. section 2.5). MMD also succeeded in pressing the
government in to accepting international election observer teams to monitor
the elections in order to prevent rigging.
The UNIP leadership, on the other hand, made consistent efforts to resist
the political changes. A number of incidents, including a lack of willingness
to conduct a proper registration of voters, the use of state-run media, the
use of other state resources for pary purposes, and the very late
announcement of the election date, signified an apparent lack of adherence
to democratic principles. The remaining parts of this report will return to
these and a number of other issues which throw light on the transition
process.
2.3 The fole of the chiefs
Traditional rulers, such as chiefs and headmen, were under one-party rule
drawn into the pary hierarchy. Their linkage to UNIP and hence the
governent had recently come more and more under attack. As UNIP
functionares, or appointed local government officials chiefs became entitled
to benefits such as salaries, allowances, vehicles, housing etc. This, so the
14 The Weekly Review, 8 November 1991, p. 32.
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argument runs, eased the burden on the subjects, who were at some stage
in the past required to maintain their chiefs' splendour with their own
funds, and was therefore welcomed.15 Chief Mwata Kazembe of Luapula
Province, for instance, recently admitted that he would be reduced to
poverty without the benefits accruing to him by virue of his post as
provincial political secretar of UNIP.16
UNIP has, indeed, always sought to maintain a strong alliance with
Zambia's 280 hereditar chiefs. The alliance goes back to the independence
struggle when the chiefs - their powers curtailed by the colonial adminis-
tration - threw their weight behind the nationalists. After independence
UNIP has, as Ben Kakoma notes, "been a great champion of bolstering up
the institution of chieftainship".17 The chiefs' role as supporters of UNIP
became evident in 1971, when Kapwepwe challenged UNIP with the
formation of his United Progressive Pary. Soon after its inauguration
Kaunda wamed the chiefs that those who were not loyal to UNIP would
not be recognised or paid by the state any longer. Chiefs, he explained,
received public funds. in order to support the government, and the
government was UNIP.18
Under one-party rule chiefs were coopted into the system by being
appointed or elected to political positions. Eight chiefs were elected to
Parliament, four of whom as appointed Ministers of State. Others were
elected to the UNIP central committee, and served as permanent secretaries
and diplomats. Those rewarded were carefully selected on an ethnic basis
and appointments were aimed at appeasing ethnic groups that were
historically opposed to UNIP.
At the local government level the linkage between chiefs and pary was
no less apparent. Chiefs have been appointed on merit as district governors,
other have doubled as UNIP party functionaries, and all chiefs were able
to appoint one representative to the distrct counciL.
During the run-up to the 1991 elections UNIP tried to maintain and
strengthen its alliance with the chiefs. In May 1991 Kaunda appointed
Senior Chief Mukuni from Southern Province as Governor of Kalomo
because "of his unwavering commitment to UNIP".19 In August 1991, at
the pary congress, UNIP re-elected two chiefs to the central committee,
one of whom, the Lozi paramount chief being heavily criticised subse-
15 Weekly Post, 4.10.1991.
16 Times of Zambia, 9.2.1991.
17 Zambia Daily Mail, 20.9.1991.
18 Times of Zambia, 9.2.1991.
19 Times 
of Zambia, 1.5.1991.
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quently.20 In addition UNIP fielded originally 12 chiefs as parliamentar
candidates for the October 1991 elections, but one withdrew his
candidature. Many observers and the newspapers reported that during the
election campaign chiefs were invited to State House with increasing
frequency. Kaunda was repeatedly reported to confir his commitment to
"see that chieftainship continues",21 and delegations of chiefs expressed
their eagerness to support UNIP.
The UNIP-dominated Mvunga Constitution Commission had,
furthermore, in 1990 recommended that "chiefs be given a more active role
in the legislative process by making provision for their representation in the
Chamber of Representatives",22 a clause that amongst many others was
opposed by MMD. The opposition pary was also criticizing the political
involvement of the chiefs, arguing that their position would require
impartiality. The UNIP leadership was quick to imply that MMD wanted
to infrnge on the chiefs' rights and som e chiefs were equally quick to
complain about "the disrespect some chiefs are receiving from some
opposition parties".23 The alleged anti-chief position attributed to MMD
went so far as to let the suggestion come up that a chiefly ceremony of the
Lunda-Kazembe in Luapula failed, because MMD had criticised the chief
for being the UNIP provincial political secretar. 24
Such discourse and practice made the role of the chiefs in a multi-pary
democracy more and more contentious. In letters to the editors of the daily
newspapers the public demanded that chiefs retire from politics and desist
from openly supporting one party, lest they force their subjects to vote for
only that party. The re-election of the Lozi paramount chief emerged as a
paricularly volatile issue, with allegations abounding that UNIP planned to
divide the ethnic group.25 UNIP and the chiefs did not help matters.
20 Zambia Daily Mail, 20.9.1991.
21 Zambia Daily Mail, 3.12.1990.
22 Republie of Zambia, Summary of the main recommendations of the Constitution
Commission of Inquiry together with the Government Reaction to the Recommendations,
Governent Paper No. 2 of 1991, Lusaka.
23 Zambia Daily Mail, 15.10.1991.
24 Times of Zambia, 4.8.1991.
25 It is much more likely that UNIP tried to tie the Lozi en bloc to the party, after Lozi
elders had reIterated that President Kaunda had violated a 1964 agreement with the Lozi
stating that the governent of Zambia would not interfere with the Lozi royal
establishment. The governent was also accused of having transferred £ 78.5 milion out
of the Lozi treasury to the Ministry of Finanee after independence. A meeting of elders
demanded in September 1990 that this money, inc1usive of interest, should be returned
(Africa Confidential 9.11.1990).
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Chieftainess Nkomeshya of Lusaka Rural, for instance, was reported to
have publicly dec1ared that she disowned one of her subjects who had
formed an opposition party,26 . and a speaker of the Lozi paramount chief
was in October 1991 alleged to have threatened that those Lozi who did not
support UNIP had to leave the province.27
UNIP functionares added to the insult. In July 1991 Western Province
Minister Munukayumbura Sipalo addressed ameeting asking "why an
ordinary person should get involved with other paries when the traditional
rulers were in support of the ruling pary".28 Chiefs who stepped out of
line were not spared. In September 1991 Chief Kapiyampanga of North-
Westem Province resigned from his UNIP parliamentar nomination in
Solwezi due to pressure from his subjects. In response, the UNIP central
committee member of the area was reported to have called him "an old
suitcase" threatening that UNIP "would only accept his withdrawal if he
would resign from UNIP and join MMD".29 The chief was not persuaded
to change his decision, and his subjects were up in arms against UNIP for
insulting their chief.
Other chiefs too were wise enough to safeguard their impariality, even
under difficult conditions. Chief Musokotwane of Southern Prov inc e
declared his impartiality although his lO-men traditional council, the Lukuni
Council, had handed in their resignation on account of having joined the
MMD campaign.30 This was all the more astonishing since his brother,
Kebby Musokotwane, the former Prime Minister, was one of UNIP's
strongest candidates standing in neighbouring Livingstone. The chairman
of the chiefs council, meanwhile, embodied the level of inter-linkage
involved at the locallevel: Apart from being the elected representative of
some 375 Toka headmen in terms of traditional leadership, he had
previously also occupied the position of UNIP ward chairman. He had
resigned from that post, he explained, because "all those that elected me
have joined MMD and since they chose me I had to folIo w their
wishes".31
26 Times of Zambia, 9.2.1 991.
27 Daily Express, 29.10.1991.
28 Times of Zambia, 9.11.1991.
29 Times of Zambia, 11.9.1991.
30 Zambia Daily Mail, 24.7.1991.
31 Zambia Daily Mail, 24.7.1991.
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2.4 De-Iinking UNIP and the government
After 17 years of one-pary rule UNIP and the governent were essentially
identicaL. UNIP' s indiscriminate usage of governent funds and the state
media for their own pary campaign, is but one of the more recent
manifestations of this virtual amalgamation. President Kaunda's statement,
reported in the New A/riean that: "Now we are going multi-pary, like
Britain, the pary in power will use all the machinery to promote itself, not
the opposition", sums up the attitude succinctly. 32
The official "end of the marage between UNIP and the state",33
effective from 4 September 1991 with the adoption of the new constitution,
throws wide circles. Innumerable members of the UNIP leadership at
district, provincial and nationalleveIs benefited from government facilities,
such as housing, vehicles and other allowances. MMD chairman for local
government and housing, Michael Sata, filed at the end of September 1991
a petition with the Lusaka High Court, seeking "UNIP' s immediate
vacation of central or local government premises, including parastatal and
residential premises" and requesting UNIP to "account for or surrender all
properties of the government including vehicles".34 The High Court
granted the order and ruled that former leaders hand over the property by
31 November. Some affected leaders have resisted the handover.35 These
problems mark the beginning of a process that stilllies ahead.
MMD has during the election campaign promised to implement a strct
parastatal reform, threatening "to remove all chief executiveswho had been
appointed under the previous government".36 Zambia's parastatals have
been a pool of profitable positions for the patrimonialism the Kaunda
government engaged in, and many now fear to lose a lot. Francis Kaunda,
the chief executive of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM),
alleged to have diverted millions of K wacha for private and pary use, was
sacked within days of Chiluba's inauguration as President. Manyexecutives
in the parastatal sector and other UNIP appointees have since met the same
fate.
But patrimonialism has also been rampant at the lower leveIs, and many
appointed UNIP and government officials, whose lifestyle has been
subsidised by state funds, are also set to lose. At the local government level
32 New African, January 1991.
33 New African, November 1991.
34 Times of Zambia, 29.9.1991.
35 SouthScan, 8.11.1991.
36 Ibid.
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the disengagement is arguably the most difficult. Democratic local
government elections were abolished in 1980 with the passing of the Local
Government Act, which has now been repealed. The act effectively
restrcted the vote for district councillors to card carying UNIP members,
and the choice of district and provincial governors was in the hands of the
President. Government and pary structures were virtually indistinguishable
at the local level, and the vast lowest level pary machinery, the ward
chairen, have in their areas of ten assumed the roles of headmen and
chiefs. In the urban areas in P aric ul ar, ward chairmen have in the
townships usurped roles beyond their pary functioo. They have often acted
as local court functionares, distrbuted plots of land, and were at some
stages involved in the registration and distrbution of the mealie meal
coupons. In urban marketplaces UNIP pary officials were instrmental in
handing out permits for traders, making sure that only UNIP members got
a stall. UNIP vigilante groups enforced, paricularly in urban and peri-urban
areas, the laws of the UNIP ward chairmen.
The dose inter-linkages between state, pary, and traditional rulers that
have now become evident will pose a lot of questions and problems in the
near future. What will happen to the overinflated UNIP party machinery
from the ward chairmen up, whose members were all partly dependent on
UNIP/state funds and facilities? And what is going to happen to the chiefs,
who have been proven not to reflect the interests of their subjects? One
would expect that their subjects, rather than the MMD government, will
start to question their authority and role. Political ambitions of the chiefs,
an editorial in the Times of Zambia suggested before the elections, might
be at a very low. Jf they are proven to be "unable to influence their subjects
politically , then their alliance with the politicians will be in gre at
jeopardy".37 The basic question which has not been answered is what role
the potentially hierarchical and possibly undemocratic institution of
chieftaincy will have in a democracy. A num ber of chiefs seem to have,
purportedly in "traditional" st yle, pledged their support to the new
government and abdicated from their UNIP positions. Whatever will happen
to the chiefs in the future, they promise to be politically weak.
2.5 The new Constitution
On 24 September 1990 Kaunda announced that the referendum on the re-
introduction of multi-party democracy had been cancelled. Shortly
37 Times o/Zambia, 15.10.1991.
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thereafter he dec1ared that a Constitutional Commission of Inquiry would
be appointed to draw up constitutional proposals for the new Third
Republie. The working method of the Commission would, inter alia,
inc1ude public hearings throughout the countr, and the review of petitions
submitted by individual citizens or organisations. The Commission,
appointed on 8 October 1990 consisted originally of 22 members, chaired
by Professor Patrick Mvunga. Two appointed members representing MMD,
Arthur N .L. Wina and Akashambatwa M. Lewanika, refused to take seat in
the Commission on grounds that its composition had been determined
unilaterally by the government and that it was heavily biased in favour of
UNIP. The Law Association of Zambia and varous church bodies also
complained about lack of consultation. MMD supporter, and later MP and
Minister of Justice, Rodger Chongwe, argued that a new constitution be
adopted by a constituent assembly of delegates drawn from "all walks of
Zambian life" and not only from the ranks of the UNIP Parliament.38
Additionally, Chongwe argued that the legislature could not itself pass a
law setting the terms of its own existence and powers.
In spite of complaints and distrust in the credibility of the Commission,
MMD and other interest groups, made oral or written submissions to the
Commission's public hearings, which took place at provincial centers from
18 October 1990 to 18 January 1991. More than 580 written and 400 oral
submissions were received, and due to the high interest among people to
present their ideas about the countr' s political future, the Commission had
to extend their hearings in order to cope with the num ber of witnesses.39
During the work on its report the Commission made a number of fitting
observations about the political mood in the countr. Specific notice was
made of the following:
A mood of anxiety, impatience and desperation among some Petitioners;
some submissions reflected resentment of the One-Pary Rule of the past
seventeen years. This resentment extended to the leadership of UNIP.
Despite the resentment, mood of anxiety, impatience and desperation,
there was a general feeling among Petitioners of the need for a peaceful
transition into a plural democracy to ensure continued political stabilty
of the country.
38 New African, April 1991, p. 19.
39 Economist Intellgenee Unit, Zambia. Country Report, No. 1, 1991, p. 7.
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There were sporadie demands from some Petitioners that the report of this
Commission of Inquiry should not be manipulated, an indication of some
mistrust and a kind of credibilty gap.
There were also noticeable gaps in the information flow concerning vital
facts about the Country amongst a number of citizens, paricularly those
far away from Lusaka.
On the basis of the evidence, there appeared to be some mistrust between
the Rulers and the Ruled, particularly in places rural and distant from
Lusaka.4o
Such opinions illustrated the deformation and deterioration of authority,
credibility and legitimacy of the one-pary state and the Kaunda
government. If taken seriously, they also documented conclusively the
deep-rooted popular dem and for profound political changes, and a re-
orientation of politics in Zambia.
The Commission concluded its report in April 1991, and in mid-June the
government released the report together with the response of the
government to the Commission's proposals. Among the most significant
proposals the Commission recommended a strong executive President, but
unlike the 1973 Constitution the terms of service of the President were to
be limited to two five-years periods. Powers of detention and restriction
without tral as well as power to declare a state of emergency was to be
vested in the Office of the President. The report also proposed that the
President have the power to dissolve Parliament, and to appoint the Cabinet
from "either outside and/or inside Parliament". The latter recommendation
was rejected by the government, which held that the Cabinet should be
"appointed from outside the Parliament and function outside the
Parliament" , and that Cabinet members should not be subject to
parliamentary ratification. As to the position of the Chiefs, the Commission
recommended that the existing House of Chiefs be abolished and that a 45-
member Chamber of Representatives with legislative powers be created
with two chiefs and three representativ es from each province.
The opposition's reaction to the report was outright rejection, and MMD
went as far as condemning the proposals as a "recipe for another dictator".
MMD's main objections were that the proposed system consolidated too
much power in the hands of the government, and in particular the
government' s proposal of appointing the cabinet from outside Parliament.
However, the issue was not only about constitutional principles. It was
40 Report of the Constitution Commission, Republie of Zambia, Lusaka, April 1991, p. 10.
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basically political, and became a key issue between the opposition and the
government. The crux of the matter was the following: During the summer
of 1991, when the new Constitution was to be approved by Parliament, it
was commonly expected that Kaunda might succeed in winning the
presidential elections but the opposition taking the majority in Parliament.
If such a situation should arse, a strong Presidency, with the prerogative
to dissolve Parliament unilaterally, in combination with a Cabinet appointed
from outside the government, would potentially create a serious political
crisis, threaten the political stability and make the country ungovernable. In
addition it would significantly marginalise the position of Parliament,
widely expected to be dominated by MMD. Frederick Chiluba argued that
the presidentially appointed ministers would be unrepresentative and
unaccountable to the people, and he requested Kaunda to withdraw the
constitutional bill and ensure that the positions of the opposition paries be
heard and considered fairly. MMD threatened to boycott the elections, and
in a press release they resolved "that there shall be no general elections
without a nationally accepted democratic constitution".
President Kaunda reacted to the critics by inviting the opposition parties
to State House for discussions. Frederick Chiluba responded that it was too
late for consultative involvement by the opposition because a white paper
and a bill to be discussed by Parliament had already been gazetted. The
issue was urgent, however, and very significant if elections were to be hel d
at all, and repeated attempts were made to bring the main opponents
together. Christian church leaders contributed to finally breaking the
deadlock over the content of the new Constitution when they succeeded to
convene and host a rare meeting on 23 July 1991 between President
Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba.41 During this meeting at the Anglican
Cathedral in Lusaka it was agreed that the proposed constitution needed
major revisions, but that more time was needed to allow for consultations
with paries outside Parliament. As a result, the constitutional proposals
were substantially amended a week later, on 31 July 1991. Among the main
amendments were provisions requiring all Cabinet members to be appointed
from the ranks of the members of Parliament; an increase in appointed
members of Parliament from five to eight; the removal of a provision
creating a constitutional court, which had given the President power to
declare mariallaw; and a provision requiring the President to consult with
Parliament before declaring a state of emergency and providing for the
41 Times of Zambia, 26.7.91. Letter of 1 July 1992 from the Foundation for Democratic
Proeess - FODEP (formerly ZEMCC) to the authors of this report.
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termination of state of emergency within seven days after the election of a
new president. 42
The new Constitution was passed by Parliament on 24 August 1991,
replacing the 1973 Constitution. Parliament was enlarged by 25 elected
members to 150, and with 8 more to be appointed by the President (as
opposed to 10 in terms of the 1973 Constitution). Under the former
Constitution the President had to appoint the government from among
members of the Central Committee of UNIP. According to the new
Constitution members of Cabinet were to be selected among MPs.
Furthermore, the new Constitution did not establish a House of Chiefs,
although Article 74 provides for the establishment of a House of
Representatives by a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority. This was,
indeed, a controversial issue during the constitution-making process. The
Mvunga Constitution Commission proposed that "the House of Chiefs be
given legislative powers and that it be enlarged in size in order to achieve
broader ethnic representation" . In conclusion the Commission recommended
that "chiefs be given a more active role in the legislation process by
making provision for their representation in the Chamber of
Representatives". The Government accepted these recommendations
together with the proposal to dissolve the House of Chief (set up under the
1973 Constitution) and to integrate the formal political functions of the
chiefs into the House of Representatives, and to bring them into the
legislative process. This proposal, however, was strongly resisted by the
opposition parties, among them MMD, and the compromise ultimately
reached deferred indefinitely the decision on the precise role of the House
of Representatives.43 The constitutional prerogatives of the chiefs have,
therefore, been considerably curtailed by this constitutional reform.
In a number of ways the Constitution of Zambia Act of 1991 represents
a constitutional and legal break with the past. Most important, of course,
is the legalisation of political parties in terms of Article 21(1), which
formal ly allows for multi-pary democracy and puts an end to the implied
identity between UNIP and the government. Other significant improvements
over the former Constitutionare the extension of the Bill of Rights to
specifically include the freedom of the press, freedom from discrimination
42 Pre-election Report. October 31, 1991 Zambian Elections, the Carter Center of Emory
University and NDI, Lusaka, October 1991, p. 8.
43 Cf. Artic1e 74 of the 1991 Constitution which states that "The National Assembly may
by a resolution passed by two-thirds majonty of its members establish a House of
Representatives to perform such functions as may be prescribed by the Constitution".
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based on sex and martal status, freedom of movement and the protection
of young persons from exploitative labour practices.
In spite of significant limitation of powers (in relation to state of
emergency, appointment of cabinet), the 1991 Constitution provides for a
strong executive president. He has the prerogative of appointing the
Cabinet, dissolve Parliament, dec1are a state of emergency, to dedare a war
(after consultations with Parliament), and to pardon or reprieve offenders.
This made observers utter concem that an overwhelming MMD
parliamentar victory would create anew a de facto one-pary state in
Zambia. When confronted with this concern in a press briefing on 30
October, Chiluba responded by referrng to his own democratic
commitments and the safeguards represented by an independent press.
2.6 Election system, electoral commission and the
delImitation proeess
The election system in place in Zambia is based on majority (or more
precisely plurality) elections in single-member constituencies, with one
round of elections and "first-past-the-post" as the guiding principles for
electing members of Parliament. The election system does not offer a
choice between more than one candidate from each pary. The new election
law was approved by the former Parliament in August 1991 shortly before
it was dissolved.
It is commonly acknowledged that a plurality method for calculating
votes in combination with single-member constituencies accords an
advantage to the strongest pary. It tends to give disproportionately more
seats to the most successful party. Moreover, the system is intended to
produce a majority government and tends to gravitate towards a two-party
constellation. Small paries without a local or regional stronghold will have
difficulties obtaining representation. An important argument against this
system is that it is restricting the electorate's range of choice to no more
than two partyaltematives. However, in countries undergoing dramatic and
rapid political and economic changes, as in the Zambian case, an important
advantage may be that a majority parliament more easily will bring a strong
and stable government.
The Zambian Constitution provides in Article 76 for an Electoral
Commission of three members appointed by the President to supervise the
registration of voters, the conduct of Presidential and Parliamentary
elections and the review and delimitation of constituencies. The
Commission's directorate is responsible for carying out the elections; to
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conduct training seminars in provinces and distrcts; to deliver election
materials (ballot boxes, voting booths, vehicles) etc. The Chairman of the
Commission, the Director of Elections, holds a public office, and his
important functions include ensuring that election officers perform their
duties impartially, and issuing instrctions to election officers. The
Permanent Secretar of each of the Provinces acts as liaison between the
Electoral Commission and the Election Officers in each constituency.
Among the tasks of the Permanent Secretares are the organisation of
transportation of election materials and equipment. Election Officers of
each constituency include an electoral officer, a registration officer, an
assistant officer, areturning officer, a presiding officer, a poll ing assistant
and counting assistants.
The Electoral Commission appoints aReturnng Officer and an assistant
returning officer to administer the elections in the constituency to which
they are assigned. The major tasks of the Returning Officer is the counting
of ballots at counting centres. The counting procedure became a major
source of controversy during the last phase of the election campaign as
MMD expressed concern that the transportation of ballot boxes from
polling stations tocounting stations would provide opportunities for
disruption or manipulation. There were 3,489 polling distrcts or polling
stations in the country. The Z- V ote on several occasions stated that given
the existing suspicion, a polling site count would be preferable.44 As
appropriate safeguards Z- V ote suggested to provide specific and definite
identification of each polling site; allowing pary agents to affix foolproof
seals to the ballot box; permitting agents from at least two paries to
accompany all ballot boxes to the counting centers; counting each ballot
box separately, and granting party agents and domestic monitors full access
to all aspects of the counting process.45 The Electoral Commission
responded positively to several of these proposals, some of which had
already been implemented.
Another problem which attracted much attention and criticism was the
alleged lack of independence and impariality of the Electoral Commission.
The problem stemmed parly from the lack of security of tenure of the
Commission members, as the President had powers to remove them.46 In
44 Pre-election Report. 31 October 1991 Zambian Elections, the Carer Center of Emory
University and NDI, Lusaka, October 1991, p. 21.
45 Ibid.
46 Cf. Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Zambia. 31 October 1991, the
Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Commonwealth Secretarat, London,
1992, p. 14.
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addition, the fact that the third member of the Commission who resigned,
was not replaced, obstructed the creation of a feeling of trust and
confidence needed among opposition paries. Criticism was also levelled
against the Chairman of the Electoral Commission for being biased in
favour of UNIP.
ZEMCC in its Final Report identifies a number of other concerns about
the work and function of the Commission. Firstly, it criticises the practice
that announcements regarding the election procedures were being made by
officials of UNIP; secondly, deep concem is express ed about the inadequate
funding and staffing provided for the Electoral Commission and Electoral
Office; and thirdly, the report alleges that the educational duty of the
Electoral Office was not properly cared OUt.47
According to the new Constitution the num ber of seats in Parliament was
extended from 125 to 150. In order to take account of the 25 new seats,
constituency boundaries had to be revised and redrawn, and the Electoral
Commission acted as a Delimitation Commission. The Commission itself
acknow ledged that time pressure precluded a more comprehensive revision
of all constituency boundares, and that it was handicapped by limited and
inaccurate data.
As a guiding principle considerable preference was given to rural
constituencies. As a result, the number of eligible voters differed
considerably between constituencies, ranging from 6,376 to 70,379. Despite
this highly disproportional distribution of voters behind MP candidates, the
suggested delimitations did not prompt major complaints. On election day,
however, constraints on logistical capabilities (vehic1es, candles or lamps)
produced serious problems at some polling stations, and delayed the
counting process.
2.7 Registration of voters
When assessing whether the elections were democratic in nature a crucial
factor to consider is whether all eligible voters had an equal opportunity to
take part in the elections. In this regard the registration of voters is a key
issue, and it became a highly controversial one in the Zambian elections.
On election day a serious problem arose as a result of flawed registration
procedures and practices, as thousands of voters failed to fin d their names
on the voters' rolls. However, what may have looked like a "recipe for
47 Zambian Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee, Setting a Standard 
for Africa:
Free and Fair Elections. Final Report, Lusaka, 7 November 1991, p. 7.
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rigging" (questions to that effect were asked by MMD in an advert
published by the Daily Express on 12 October 1991), were most likely
serious incidents of election mismanagement and inadequate election
preparations.
According to the election code, a general registration of voters is to be
made every five years, one year ahead of elections. The code states that
only a person who holds a voter's card and National Registration Card may
vote. Subsequent to each election year, registration rolls are revised to
reflect additions, deletions and inaccuracies. The last general registration
had been compiled in October 1988. During a three~month period in 1990,
in preparation for the proposed referendum on the introduction of a multi~
pary system, a supplementar registration was conducted, and in July 1991
the tentativ e electoral rolls were made available for the public to check
inaccuracies and suggest corrections. The final electoral roll was released
in September 1991.
The final polling statistics show ed that only 2,9 million Zambians had
registered as voters. Due to lack of reliable statistics it is difficult to make
conc1usive calculations about the proportion of eligible voters who had
actually registered. One study of the voters' register, however, when taking
cognizance of the age structure of the population, seems to be fairly
credible. It suggests that the total number of eligible voters was about 3,5
million, which means that 83 per cent of eligible voters were registered.48
The Delimitation Report of the Electoral Commission, according to the Pre-
Election report of Z~Vote (using a higher figure of eligible voters), put the
percentage at 75.49
When elections were announced in September 1991 the opposition
required an extended registration period to accommodate persons who had
reached the voting age of 18 years since the supplementar registration
period in October 1990. They also argued that many potential voters did
not register for the referendum due to lack of interest in that paricular
issue, and that they did not anticipate that the voters' rolls for the
referendum was to be applied to the multi-party general elections. However,
the requests for re-opening of the registration lists were turned down by the
48 Sara Longwe and Roy Clarke, AGender Perspective on the Zambian General Election
ofOctober 1991, Lusaka, December 1991. This study was commissioned by the authors
of the present report, cf. Table on Distribution of People on the Voters Register, by
Province, Sex and Age. The calculations of Longwe & Clarke are based on World Ban
figures on the age structure of the population, cf. World Bank Report 1991, Oxford
University Press, 1991, Table 26, p. 254.
49 Pre-election Report. 31 October 1991 Zambian Elections, the Carer Center of Emory
University and NDI, Lusaka, October 1991, p. 17.
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government. A similar response was made by the governent to the request
to allow anyone with a National Registration Card to vote.50 As aresult,
many young potential voters having reached the voting age of 18 years, or
having changed their address after the register was closed, were, in effect,
disenfranchised.51
The requirement that voters had to present both their national registration
and voter's cards caused additional and serious difficulties at the polling
stations. Although the procedure for an annual revision of the voters'
register allowed for the replacement of lost voting cards, no such revision
took place in 1991. The Electoral Commission's allowance for issuing of
a provisional Certificate of Authority to vote, proved to be inadequate in
many distrcts since many voters had to travel long distances to obtain
them, and of ten failed to obtain them on their first visit. As aresult, many
voters were disenfranchised for this reason as weii.52
In a comparative analysis of the V oters Registration rolls and the Report
of the Delimitation Commission issued by MMD shortly after their release,
a num ber of anomalies were identified, including lack of correspondence
between the polling sites listed in the electoral rolls and those listed in the
Delimitation Commission report. Some polling districts had been omitted
in the Delimitation Report, thus showing a surplus of vot~rs in the voters'
registers with no corresponding polling districts. Reviews of randomly
selected polling districts (i.e. in Mongu and Libala polling districts) verified
this observation.
The Electoral Commission responded favourably to the objections raised
by MMD and agreed to publish complete lists of all polling sites and the
number of voters in each polling district. Inaccuracies did remain, however,
and on 17 October, less than two weeks before the elections, MMD
complained that "there is no agreed number of voters in all polling
districts".53 According to MMD estimates discrepancies existed between
voters' registers and the registers used by the Election Offices.
50 Zambian Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee, Setting a Standard for Africa:
Free and Fair Elections. Final Report, Lusaka, 7 November 1991, p. 6.
51 Cf. Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Zambia. 31 October 1991, Report
of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Commonwealth Secretarat, London, 1992, p.
15 f.
52 Ibid.
53 Pre-election Report. 31 October 1991 Zambian Elections, the Carer Center of Emory
University and NDI, Lusaka, October 1991, p. 17.
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Discrepancies also existed between the locality of polling stations issued by
retuming officers and those issued by the Election Offlces.54
As a result of the delimitation of constituencies, serious problems
occurred on election day as thousands of voters were turne d away at their
polling stations to look for their names on the voting lists of other polling
stations. The delimitation had created several "ghost" polling distrcts,
misplaced others, omitted som e and made it impossible for thousands of
voters to poll. Some voters were able to flnd their names in the second or
third polling stations they came to, others were not able to walk long
distances to search for their names and eventually gave up altogether.
Anomalies of this kind were also observed by the authors of this report
when visiting polling stations in the Lusaka township Mandevu, leaming
that a polling station had been moved from one place to another without
notice. Election Offlce acting deputy director, Robson Mwansa, publicly
confirmed that the electoral process was riddled with anomalies but
dismissed the possibility of anybody rigging the elections.55 This appears
to be a valid conclusion, but it also confirms that there is an urgent need
to improve the procedures and management of the election process, in
particular the procedures of voter registration.
The turn-out rate at the elections was as low as 45.07 and 45.54 per cent
in the parliamentary and presidential elections respectively, which means
that about i.3 million voters cast their vote. Accordingly, only 37 per cent
of the estimated eligible electorate (of 3.5 million according to our
calculation) voted, and MMD government only received the active electoral
support of a little less than 1 million (977,000) voters, which is about 28
per cent of the estimated total electorate. Hence, although the support of
MMD was overwhelming in relative flgures, the elections were not entirely
successful in mobilizing the electorate.
These figures illustrate fundamental problems in a participatory
democratic process, and in Zambia they also illustrate inappropriate or
inadequate registration procedures, and a blatant unwillingness on the part
of the UNIP government to address the registration issue properly by
allowing up-dating of the election rolls in the election year. Although the
figures do not question the free and fair nature of the elections and the
election campaign, they nevertheless raise questions about the democratic
procedures, in particular in terms of registration procedures and election
administration.
54 Ibid.
55 Times of Zambia, 1 November 1991.
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3. The election campaign
3.1 The state of emergency
The state of emergency had been in effect in Zambia since 28 July 1964,
a few months before independence. Under the former Constitution, the
existence of the state of emergency conferred wide powers upon the
President under the Preservation of Security Act. According to this act the
President had powers to make regulations to provide, inter alia, for
detention without trial. It also gave the President powers to restrct the
movement of people and to withhold or withdraw passports to prevent
foreign travel by persons whose activities were regarded as inimical to
Zambian interests. The state of emergency also required a permit to hold
a rally or a large meeting.
Over the years the existence of the state of emergency has had far-
reaching consequences with respect to human rights. Most importantly it
has effectively negated the idea of a Bill of Rights as a bulwark of defence
of the individuaL. As a result, the rights of the individual was not protected .
by the Constitution, but rather by the arbitrary benevolence of the President.
The state of emergency also gave room for police brutality. In spite of
significant improvements in the human rights record of the country since
the reform process began, a number of acts of police brutality were reported
from a number of townships in the weeks prior to the elections. Ostensibly
deployed to curb crime, paramilitary forces were allegedly licenced to act
beyond their normal duties. When reporting on the brutal killing of a man
at a paramilitar post in the Lusaka township of Kalingalinga, one observer
commented that "as the countdown to the elections nears, fear and tension
has gripped people over these brutal acts" (cf. section 3.2 on incidents of
intimidation).
The original reason for introducing the state of emergency was that
Zambia was surrounded by countries with serious and violent internal
conflicts (Mozambique, South Africa, former Southern Rhodesia, Angola
and Namibia) and that severalliberation movements were organizing their
activities from Zambian terrtory. During his years in office Kaunda of ten
maintained that he could not lift the state of emergency as long as
Mozambican Renamo bandits continued to attack and kilI innocent
Zambians. With the ending of the wars in Zimbabwe and Namibia the
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rationale behind the state of emergency became less convincing although
it continued to legalise the activities of paramilitary forces, detention of
suspects, police roadblocks and the introduction of curfews. Over the years
innumerable acts of intimidation and harassment have been perpetrated by
the police and paramilitary units under cover of the state of emergency.
The state of emergency became an important and much debated issue
during the election campaign. Bitter accusations were made frequently. The
opposition and the national and international monitoring teams argued that
the continued state of emergency was a serious threat to the conduct of free
and fair elections. In particular, the existence of strngent measures that
could be taken by the government under the state of emergency were in
themselves potentially causing fear and suspicion among the citizens and
paries, thereby undermining the fairness and the free conduct of the
election campaign.1
In July 1991 Kaunda responded to the complaints by committing himself
to lift the state of emergency before the start of the election campaign "if
there were no threats to Zambia's peace and stability". He did not act on
his commitment, however, until September, when he, in a private
conversation with former US President Carter, reiterated his readiness to lift
the state of emergency by the end of that month, and authorised Carer to
make the announcement to that effect on his behalf.
At this time, the new Constitution had been introduced, and Parliament
dissolved. When it was time to put into effect Kaunda's decision to remove
the state of emergency, confusion arose as to the powers of the President
to do so. The Attorney-General intervened and advised Kaunda that he was
not, in terms of the Constitution, in a position to lift the state of emergency
without the approval of Parliament which had already been dissolved.
Kaunda accepted this interpretation of the Constitution and explained that
he had been unaware of this limitation of his authority.
A tense debate ensued on the interpretation of the constitutional
provisions with regard to the lifting of the state of emergency, many groups
contesting the position of the Attorney-General. However, in meetings with
Lisbeth Palme, a Z- V ote representative, Kaunda made reassurances that "he
would not implement restrictive measures under the state of emergency'?
and MMD decided not to make the state of emergency a litmus test issue.3
It did continue, however, to cause tension. On 21 October, the national
1 Press statement by ZEMCC, 2 October 1991.
2 Press Release, Z-Vote 14 October 1991.
3 Pre-election Report. 31 October 1991 Zambian Elections, the Carer Center of Emory
University and NDI, Lusaka, October 1991, p. 11.
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chairan of MMD, Elias Chipimo, maintained that Kaunda "on his own
has the powers to recall a recessed Parliament which can lift the state of
emergency".4 Chipimo also said that Kaunda had declared a curfew as a
means of intimidating innocent people, and that this was why he did not
want to lift the state of emergency. On 25 October the Daily Express
reported that the vice-president of MMD, Levy Mwanawasa, had opposed
the validity of the state of emergency because no provision existed for it in
the new Constitution. Addressing a rally in Kitwe he wamed that he would
"deal with the police" after the elections for harassing and aresting
innocent people at night.5
The dispute became increasingly confused about the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions. The then Attorney-General, F.M. Chomba, for
instance, described pronouncements by MMD candidate and now Minister
of Legal Affairs, Rodger Chongwe, that the President was empowered to
lift the state of emergency as "a figment of his own imagination".6 In the
remarkable advert published by the Public Relations Unit of UNIP in the
Times of Zambia on 25 October, in which internationalobservers were
attacked for pursuing an imperialist strategy in Zambia, UNIP, on its part,
seemed to indicate that the state of emergency may be needed in a post-
election period in order to prevent uprising against a UNIP govemment.7
Hence, the state of emergency had to remain in force, it was claimed.
Nonetheless, in spite of incidents of intimidation and harassment of
members of the opposition, in particular by paramilitar personneI in
townships and compounds (cf. section 3.2), it appears that the existence of
the state of emergency did not substantially obstruct the conduct of the
opposition's campaign throughout the country.
3.2 Incidents of intimidation
Accusations of intimidation during the election campaign were directed
against both major paries, UNIP and MMD, against each other and by the
public against both parties. As the election campaign gathered momentum,
representatives of both parties resorted increasingly to the issuing of threats
of violence against their adversaries, the defamation of prominent pary
4 Daily Express, 22 October 1991.
5 Daily Express 25 October 1991.
6 Times of Zambia, 29 October 1991.
7 Times of Zambia, 25 October 1991.
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members, and the spreading of rumours about civil strife and unrest during
and after the elections.
Innumerable allegations of intimidation were recei ved by both the ZIMT-
run complaints office and ZEMMC in the run-up to the elections. Many
allegations, however, had to be treated as mere defamation and could not
be followed up as written statements could not be obtained. According to
a spokesperson of ZIMT, the majority of complaints received were directed
against UNIP, but occasional complaints against MMD were also recorded.
Intimidation of opposition members
Reports of UNIP intimidation of MMD members were reported already in
the latter half of 1990. In November that year, for example, the then
Secretary of State for Defense and Security, Alex Shapi, was said to have
incited supporters in a Lusaka township to identify houses of MMD
supporters and threatened that "the governor and other leaders will devise
plans to make it practically impossible for these non-UNIP supporters to
live in their areas".8 In June 199 "threats to sack pro-MMD civil servants
and to withdraw licences from traders thought to be from the opposition"
were becoming more common.9
One group likely to lose their trading licences were the mostly female
marketeers, who by nec es sit y have always formed the bulk of UNIP's
Women's League. In order to obtain a market stall and keep it "one had to
be involved in various party activities" and therefore be a registered active
member, admitted one marketeer shortly after the elections.lO And the
marketeers were aware of the penalties for stepping out of line. In 1988 a
UNIP minister had wamed them that government would repossess the
market stands of those who voted against Kaunda.11 In September the
National Women's Lobby Group failed to hold a meeting on Luburma
Market in Lusaka, because UNIP officials allegedly threatened to repossess
the market stalls of those women attending the meeting of what was
believed to be opposition sympathisers.12
President Kaunda has also gone on record issuing threats that he would
deal with opposition members after the elections. According to a number
8 Sunday Times of Zambia, 4. i 1.1991.
9 New African, August 1991.
10 Sunday Times of Zambia, 10. i 1.1991.
11 New African, September 1991.
12 Zambia Daily Mai!, 1.10.1991.
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of election monitors Kaunda had publicly announced that he would not
forget his opponents after a UNIP victory. In September, for example, he
was reported to have wamed that "wrong-doers would have it thick in the
Third Republic".13 In late September 1991 the Weekly Post suggested that
according to the remarks of Kaunda at varous rallies "more than half of the
population will be dealt with severely for being troublemakers by opposing
UNIP".14 And Sikota Wina of MMD, remarking on Kaunda's threats,
dec1ared: "Re says, he will imprison us. ,,15
UNIP intimidation was also reported from the townships, such as in
Kitwe, from where MMD ward chairman Mutale wrote in a letter to the
editor: "Here in Kitwe's Lubwa ward we are getting threats from UNIP
leaders who are urging us to join them if we do not want to be worked
out. ,,16
Other, more subtle methods of intimidation by UNIP also emerged. In
Kitwe UNIP apparently took over the issuing of mealie meal coupons -
Zambia's food subsidy for the poor - and issued them only to their own
members and those pledging to vote for them.17 A school teacher in
Choma, for example, complained to the ZIMT office in September 1991
that he was forced by a UNIP candidate to stop teaching and atten d a UNIP
rally with his pupils. And the employees of Lusaka Hotel alleged that their
employer had taken notes of their national registration and voters cards and
thereby transgressed the right to the secrecy of the vote.18
Members of the monitoring teams were not spared UNIP threats that they
would be dealt with. One of the lawyers working with ZIMT disclosed that
she had many threatening calls from UNIP members, calling her names and
telling her to clear her desk, since she would lose her job after the
election.19
But UNIP intimidation also overstepped the mere threat. In Januar 1991
Humphrey Mulemba of MMD was reported to be targeted by UNIP. The
fields of his farm were reported to have been set on fire by UNIP
vigilantes, and he was forced to live under a 24 hour guard.20 The burning
of houses, crops and granares of MMD supporters were also reported from
13 Zambia Daily Mail, 14.9.1991.
14 Weekly Post, 20.8.1991.
15 Daily Express, 21.10.1991.
16 Times of Zambia, 31.10.1991.
17 Daily Express, 29.10.1991.
18 Letters to ZIMT, September 1991.
19 Personal communication, name witheld.
20 New African, January 1991.
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UNIP's stronghold in Eastern Province?1 These incidents were also
referred to in the pre-election report of Z- Vote.22
In the last month before the election two MMD parliamentar candidates
were alleged victims of UNIP violence. Rodger Chongwe and his wife were
attacked by a group of UNIP vigilantes while campaigning in his
constituency. Dipak Patel, although himself not hurt, had his security guard
beaten up and his car demolished on his property in Lusaka. In the first
case UNIP involvement was proven, while the second case was less clear.
Round about the same time it was also all eg ed that UNIP vigilantes were
involved in a series of murders in Luanshya on the Copperbelt.23
What all these cases of violence and intimidation have in common is that
while arests were made in some cases, prosecution of the attackers was not
forthcoming. One of the attackers of Rodger Chongwe for example, the
UNIP ward chairman of Chaisa, was released on police bond, and reported
to have addressed a rally in Chaisa, where the attack had happened, a few
days later?4 The Weekly Post pointed out that the police had not dealt
"firmly with UNIP violence", predictably so, the paper concluded, since the
heads of police and ary had until August 1991 been UNIP central
committee members.25
Allegations of UNIP plots and attempts to kilI MMD members were also
frequently reported. MMD President Chiluba believed that "numerous
attempts on his life and that of MMD members had been made".26 The
Mtendere MMD ward chairman in Lusaka claimed that a UNIP plot to
liquidate him and his family was being hatched after he had exposed that
UNIP had offered him K 20,000 to defect from MMD?7 The Daily
Express claimed that "UNIP has sponsored 85 strongmen in Kanyama
compound in Lusaka to eliminate any staunch MMD supporters".28
Be these incidents of intimidation proven or not, one fact does stand out:
Allegations against MMD intimidation are much fewer. Vice-President of
MMD, Levy Mwanawasa, has gone on record for threatening publicly that
under an MMD government UNIP voting areas could not hope for
21 Weekly Post, 29.10.1991.
22 Carer Center of Emory University and National Democratie Institute for International
Affairs, Pre-Election: Report October 31, 1991 Zambian Elections, Lusaka Oct. 1991
23 Personal communicationfrom Dag Aares, NORAD, Lusaka.
24 Daily Express, 29.10 1991.
25 Weekly Post, 29.10.1991.
26 Times of Zambia, 28.10.1991.
27 Times of Zambia, 29.10.1991.
28 Daily Express, 24.10.1991.
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development and that UNIP members would be held answerable for their
mistakes.29 Chiluba was in October 1991 reported to have wamed that if
UNIP would fail to stop their campaign of intimidation "MMD will also
learn to intimidate".30 The Eagle Express claimed that Chief Kasempa was
assaulted by people believed to be members of MMD "causing bodily har
on his left ar".31 The UNIP dis trc t political secretar of Ndola
complained that MMD supporters were very rough, throwing stones at
UNIP supporters and calling them names.32 A day before the election the
then Minister of Home Affairs, General Chinkuli, was sto ned by MMD
supporters when he chose to drive through an exited MMD crowd attending
a very large rally in Lusaka. More telling during his attack was the fact that
the Minister was able to produce a gun and fire several shots.33
I ntimidation by paramilitary forces
Possibly the most effective means of intimidating the public was available,
however, only to UNIP: The deployment of paramilitary forces in the
townships and compounds. Zambian citizens have a clear perception of the
deployment of paramilitary personneI in "situations of crisis". Paramilitary
forces have been manning roadblocks in the name of Zambian security for
years, and have been known to overstep their role by harassing innocent
people. It is almost unquestionable, therefore, that the deployment of
paramilitar forces in the townships before the elections did not instill a
fe eling of security in the township dwellers, but an atmosphere of fear and
intimidation. The paramilitar were by all accounts, as was suggested by
the government, not engaged in curbing crime, but in keeping an unofficial
curfew, curtailing people' s freedom of movement after dark.
The Legal and Security Committee of ZIMT did receive a number of
complaints about the conduct of the paramilitary from township residents,
and addressed the matter in a letter to the Inspector General of the Police
strongly condemning the transgressions by the paramilitary as "ultimately
amount(ing) to intimidation". Reports by the press confirm this.
In Kitwe residents expressed worres about the conduct of paramilitary
officers who molested and beat up people at night. They were accused of
29 Interview with Rev. Sakala, ZEMCC, 26.10.1 991.
30 Weekly Post, 11.10.1991.
31
Eagle Express, 25.10.1991.
32 Interview, 29.10.1991.
33 Times of Zambia, 31.10.1 99 1.
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stirrng up civil unrest and chaos by indiscriminately caring out corporal
punishments, and by stopping taxis and beating passengers, after ordering
the taxi driver to leave his passengers behind.34 The Weekly Post reported
that "fear and panic has gripped townships" , where "heavily ared police
have run amok harassing residents under undeclared curfew". 35 Reports
from Kalingalinga township - one of the poorest in Lusaka - were even
more damning. The township had "like most other townships in the countr
... ground to a virtual halt at night as people fear to venture out of their
homes". Residents were arested and beaten up but never charged with any
offence. One Kalingalinga resident, B. Mwansongo, died at a paramilitary
post in Kalingalinga after he had been picked up one night by the forces.
And an UNZA student reported that he was dragged from his home and
kicked and beaten throughout the night. No wonder that the residents of
Kalingalinga accused the paramilitary of being "legalised thugs".36
Threats of chaos and civil strife
Jf the deployment of paramilitary forces in the townships created a feeling
of living under siege, the two major pares did contrbute further to instill
such fears in the Zambian population. Images of civil war and chaos during
and after the elections were frequently evoked by members of both parties.
Already in December 1990 Kaunda was reported to have suggested that
MMD planned to challenge "UNIP's right to rule ... by killing people".37
In September 1991 he wared that Zambia will become another Liberia if
UNIP loses the elections.38 Similar statements were repeated during the
month of September.39 Situations of civil war in other African countries
were also evoked in a UNIP election advertisement on television which
depicted brutal scenes of violence from what was believed to be Ethiopia,
Angola, and Mozambique. Public pronouncements by President Kaunda
were common that MMD was standing for war and hatred and was out to
fan violence in Zambia.40 UNIP speakers alleged that MMD planned "to
34 Sunday Times of Zambia, 27.1 0.1991.
35 Weekly Post, 25.10.1991.
36 Ibid.
37 Zambia Daily Mail, 10.12.1990.
38 Weekly Post, 20.9.1991.
39 See for example Sunday Times of 
Zambia, 1.9.1991 and Zambia Daily Mail, 17.9.1991.
40 Zambia Daily Mail, 29.10.1991.
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usurp political power by the barel of the gun".41 Kaunda rumoured that
"MMD' s plan was to provoke violence in Zambia so that when the law
caught up with them they would claim they had been victimised".42
Despite his pronouncements Kaunda publicly denied "that he was inciting
the nation into riotous frenzy". He told a large rally in Lusaka that "his
warings were not intended to scare or incite but to war people to vote
wisely to avoid economic, political, and social chaos".43 The difference he
pointed out so avidly was very subtle indeed.
MMD's major contrbution to the rumour mongering about violence were
accusations in the sec ond half of October, to the effect that UNIP was
ferring ars into Malawi and was training a private ary in readiness for
an attack after an MMD election victory. The allegations were made by
MMD parliamentary candidate Michael Sata, and by Chiluba himself, but
were never substantiated. Sata had alleged during an MMD rally that the
government was hiding ars in Sinamisale in Eastern Province, but
subsequently failed to prove his allegations.44 In a similar attack Chiluba,
during an election rally in Ndola, accused Kaunda of having trained a
private 400 men ary near Lusaka "to cause civil strife in Zambia because
he has not accepted the prospect of losing Thursday's elections".45 UNIP
dismissed the allegations the following day, explaining that the trained men
were merely security guards of a parastatal company.46
MMD supporters were reported to have threatened to "take to the streets"
should they lose the elections, but with the exception of the above cases
MMD leaders seem to have kept a lower profile in evoking civil unrest
than UNIP.47 The threat of violence and unrest in connection with an
MMD defeat in the elections concentrated on fears of a popular uprising,
rioting, and looting. UNIP, on the other hand, was seen as being capable
of organised suppression and terror.
The fear and distinct possibility of civil unrest had gripped not only the
common people. Embassies were on alert, ready to evacuate their people,
shopkeepers barrcaded their shops and secured their goods, and a feeling
almost of awe marked e1ection day.
41
Eagle Express, 25.10.1991.
42 Sunday Times of Zambia, 27.10.1991.
43 Zambia Daily Mail, 28.10.1991.
44 Zambia Daily Mail, 26. and 28.10.1991.
45 Times of Zambia, 28.10.1991.
46 Zambia Daily Mail, 29.10.1991.
47 Carer Center/NDI, op.cit., p. 13.
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As it turned out, appeals by the monitoring teams, paricularly the
church-dominated ZEMCC, to reconciliation and peace, were heeded, and
the leaders of both main paries, Chiluba and Kaunda, called on the
Zambian people to keep calm and peaceful and to let the spirit of
reconciliation and forgiveness reign. And so they did.
But the threats, intimidation and talk of civil strfe did not go unnoticed.
Three days after the election, w hen the new President was already sworn
in, one of the main Lusaka markets, normally busy and livelyon a Sunday
morning, was almost empty. Many traders and customers had stayed away,
because, as a marketeer pointed out: "Many are afraid the civil war is
coming and they have stayed in their homes. ,~8
Just how much the electorate could be intimidated by theats of civil war
is suggested by a post-election report from Eastern Province. According to
M. Mulla, the provincial chairman of ZIMT, UNIP threats of civil war did
fall on open ears there, since the province had in the recent past suffered
under Renamo attacks. Furthermore, the writer alleges that UNIP explicitly
referred to Renamo attacks in their election campaign, threatening that an
MMD victory would cause further atrocities. Many voters, the writer
conc1udes, were therefore not only afraid to vote at all, or to vote freely,
but also to cultivate their fields be fore the elections lest they lose all their
inputs.49
3.3 The media
Under the one-pary state the media in Zambia were - while officially
state-owned - factually in the hands of UNIP. Editors to the then only
Zambian daily newspapers - the Times of Zambia and the Zambia Daily
M ail - were appointed and removed by Kaunda by presidential decree. Up
until the emergence of MMD, Zambian news coverage was by no means
bad. The Times of Zambia, the qualitatively better newspaper, often carred
critical news coverage, and had been relatively autonomous, compared to
similar papers in neighbouring countries. This changed with the emergence
of an organised opposition. The Kaunda government left no doubt that it
was strongly opposed not only to the opposition using the state media for
their own concerns, but also against independent media.
In December 1990 Kaunda removed the editors of the two daily papers
from their posts for allegedly allowing coverage of the activities of the
48 Interview, Luburma Market, Lusaka, 3.11.1991.
49 M. Mulla, Chipata, in a letter to the chairman of ZIMT, 13.11.1991.
41
opposition in their publications.50 The neweditors were appointed on the
strength of their UNIP allegiance. They were wared against covering
MMD news items or accepting MMD advertisements.
Prospects for independent newspapers were also dim and riddled with
problems. The National Mirror, a church-run fortnightly new sp aper, which
cared non-conformist, pro-democracy editorials, had to fight against
threats by the government. It and a monthly MMD newsletter, published
since June 1990, were often "bought up in bulk by the state security system
to keep in the government morgue".51
Other new newspapers had a hard time coming out, since such printing
companies that were av ailabl e, were either parastatals and banned from
taking work from the opposition, or they were intimidated into compliance
with the ruling pary.52 The MMD-based Sunday Express, for example,
could not be launched as scheduled in December 1990, because the printing
company abrogated the contract on instruction from high er authorities.53
And in April 1991 a production manager in the university printing
deparment was suspended for printing the MMD newsletter.54
When, in the beginning of 1991, MMD had ordered its own printing
press from South Africa, financed by a multinational company with
extensive investments in Zambia, parastatals and government institutions
were bared from advertising in the independent press, and independent
companies were threatened with repercussions.55
Despite opposition the press had blossomed in the latter half of 1991.
The MMD published a daily newspaper, Daily Express, which was very
much an MMD mouthpiece. UNIP brought out a new UNIP weekly, Eagle
Express, which kept no pretence of impariality. Possibly the most
independent of the new papers is the Weekly Post, whose motto, "They
bury. We dig", aptly describes its policy. The paper's managing director is
a founding member of the MMD, but unlike the Daily Express and the
Eagle Express its aim is to be impartial, and not to propagate MMD
views.56 The paper seems to stick to its motto. During the election
50 The Star, 24.9.1991.
51 African Business, Februar 1991.
52 New African, April 1991.
53 African Business, February 1991.
54 New African, June 1991.
55 African Business, February 1991.
56 The Star, 24.9.1991.
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campaign the paper received threats both from MMD and UNIP for
exposing scandals involving either of the contending paries.57
Matters were worse with the state-owned and government-run television
and radio stations. At the end of September the Carer Center/NDI team
complained about the P ari alit y of the press, and pointed out the electronic
media as the most biased. A press statement released by the Carer Center
claimed that while the news coverage of the printed media had greatly
improved since the August pre-election mission, "radio and television
broadcasts have not equalled this degree of equity".58 The Zambia
National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) further angered the international
observers when it boycotted a panel discussion organised by former US
President Carter on the role of the press.59
Z-Vote had in September 1991 initiated an independent review of the
main news on radio and television. Coverage and content of the news
varied, but the Z-Vote team conc1uded that UNIP was on the whole
favoured.60
Difficulties also existed for the opposition to buy advertising time from
ZNBC. The Corporation refused to accept political advertising spots from
MMD, ostensibly because they criticised the governing party. MMD had
managed to gain a court injunction requiring the television station to air
their commercials, but the injunction was again withdrawn a few days later.
Z-Vote thereafter strongly urged ZNBC to "refrain from setting itself as the
arbiter of "truth" and avoid censorship".61
Censorship of the broadcasting corporation had, however, not only hit
MMD and other opposition parties. When in July Enoch Kavindele had
challenged Kaunda for the post of UNIP president, ZNBC rejected his
campaign advertisements on radio and television unless he produced
approval from UNIP. ZNBC only allowed the adv erts after Kavindele
threatened a court injunction against Kaunda's adv erts aired on radio and
television. 62
The central figure within ZNBC was its director-general, Steven Moyo,
a former University of Zambia academic. According to undisclosed sources
he has, the London-based Index on Censorship reported in June 1991, be en
57 Weekly Post, 29.10.1991.
58 CarerCenter/NDI, Media Advisory, 25.9.1991.
59 Weekly Post, 27.9.1991.
60 The Z- V ote report summarzing the findings of its media survey was unfortunately not
made available to the authors of this report.
61 Carer Center/NDI, op. cit., P 13.
62 New African, September 1991.
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linked to the notorious Special Branch, Zambia's Security Service under the
Office of the President. The article alleged that the Special Branch
intimidated journalists through the interception of mail, bugging of
telephones, interrogations, and the refusal to extend accreditation of foreign
correspondents.
During an interview with a foreign journalist Moyo rejected claims of
being biased and explained that "the MMD were wrong to think that they
automatically deserved equal air time". 63 Re also dismissed MMD
allegations that he was a Member of the UNIP campaign directorate.64
The Press Association of Zambia (P AZA) eventually targeted Steven
Moyo and the editor of the Times of Zambia, Bwendo Mulengela, and in
early October 1991 filed an application for an injunction to restrain the two
media chiefs from holding office until after the elections.65 They
threatened a general strike of all journalists should the hearng be postponed
until after the election. The court granted the injunction against the media
chiefs on 10 October, but on 31 October they were reportedly reinstated in
their positions awaiting their appeal cases.66 During their suspension news
coverage of the election campaign improved dramatically, particularly that
of ZNBC.
MMD's Vice-President, Levy Mwanawasa, had in July 1991 threatened
the above media chiefs that "as soon as MMD is in power after October
they w 
ill 
lose their jobS".67 They did, indeed, almost immediately after the
MMD-dominated government to 
ok over. In the case of the editor of the
Times of Zambia the case clearly falls within the MMD purge of UNIP
appointed officials. The case of Steven Moyo appears to be somewhat
different, since he seems to have gone through normal application channels
for the position he lost after MMD's take-over.
Some might feel that his dismissal will set a bad example. The MMD has
before and after their election victory confirmed that they were committed
to free and independent media, and would encourage the present range of
newspapers. An editorial in the Weekly Post, however, dared to note that
both paries have in the recent past demonstrated hostility against critical
media coverage, no matter how objective and justified it was.68
63 New African, August 1991.
64 Björnlund, E., M. Bratton and C. Gibson, Observing Multipary Elections in Africa:
Lessonsfrom Zambia, African AfJairs, No. 91, 1992, p. 419.
65
Weekly Post, 4.10.1991.
66 Zambia Daily Mail, 31.10.1991.
67 New African, July 1991.
68
Weekly Post, 29.10.1991.
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3.4 Gender: A non-issue
Zambian women did not have much scope for political paricipation in
Kaunda's one-party state. The only access to government was via UNIP's
Women' s League, which together with the Y outh League formed what was
termed the "mass movements" of the pary. While the Women's League
was broadly organised with branches reaching down to the ward level, it
was far from bein g a mass movement. Membership in UNIP's Women's
League had been rapidly declining since the mid-1980s, when large
numbers of younger Zambian women stared to reject the images and
policies advocated by the League. Their policies, if they formulated them
at all, were strictly subordinated to the aims of the male dominated pary,
and the League's leaders of ten proved to be fervent supporters oflegislation
directed against women. Campaigns against single women - scapegoated
as prostitutes - and against the legalisation of contraception and abortion
are but a few examples. Many of the intellectual, professional women have,
therefore, shunned being involved in UNIP's one-pary politics, and have
concentrated their activities in local NGOs. The remaining support base for
UNIP's Women's League were the middle-aged, only modestly educated
women, who were willing to represent the party's narrow image of a proper
woman: The heft y "mothers" dressed in pary colours, who would sing and
dance at the airport and worship the male pary leadership, from the
President down to the ward chairman.69 Many of them are marketeers
who, in order to obtain and keep a market stall, had to follow UNIP
lines.70
The rise of the MMD opened up hopes for alternative political
engagement for women, but so far changes have not materialised. In the
fielding of women parliamentar candidates UNIP and MMD kept an
equally low profile: Both UNIP and MMD nominated only seven female
candidates each.71 In view of the fact that women make up 53 per cent of
the electorate, women candidates were more than just under -represented.
Furthermore, the candidature of these few women did not gain much
publicity. Lisbeth Palme on returning from a pre-election visit to Zambia
under the auspices of Z- V ote, declared that "media on all sides appear to
69 Multi-Party News, October 1991.
70 Geisler, G., Sisters under the Skin: Women and the Women's League in Zambia, Journal
of Modem Afriean Studies, 25, 1, 1987, pp. 43-66.
71 The press mistakenly reported on several occasions that MMD had fielded 7 and UNIP
only 5 female candidates.
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have avoided covering the campaigns of the 12 (sic!) women candidates,
both UNIP and MMD".72
A survey of the media coverage of gender issues pertaining to the
election during October 1991 did indeed confirm Lisbeth Palme's
suspicions, in so far as gender issues were found to be grossly neglected.
Coverage of parliamentar candidates was found to be slightly ahead of the
actual proportion of women amongst candidates (cf. report by Longwe &
Clarke in appendix 2). Lisbeth Palme was, apparently, the only election
monitor who publicly expressed concern about the fairness of the election
with regard to women. As Longwe and Clarke rightly point out, non e of the
monitoring teams, neither national nor international, did address the gender
issue in their programmes, plans of action or manuals. According to these
documents none of the monitoring teams aimed at gaining information
about the disaggregation by gender of both registered and actual voters,
none paid attention to the news coverage on gender issues, about women' s
access to polling stations, and the information that reached them about the
elections etc. (see appendix 3).
Lacking publicity on female candidates and gender issues during the
election campaign was partly compensated by the emergence of the
National Women's Lobby Group (NWLG), which later supported the
ZEMCC monitoring team. Lack of representation of women in the
elections, both as candidates and as an issue in the election campaign had
prompted the formation of the group. The group's aim was to lobby for
female candidates on a non-partisan basis, and to represent the interests of
women voters in general. Its success was very limited, however, and the
liule publicity created was often distorted by the media.
The group had to suffer strong opposition from UNIP. In NWLG's role
of election monitor UNIP accused it of being pro- MMD and financed by
the United States as stooges of imperialism.73 The meetings called by the
NWLG for women during the election campaign were boycotted and
disturbed by UNIP pary officials with the backing of the Women's League
of that party. 74
Although gender issues gained liule recognition during the election
campaign and the elections themselves, they became a contentious issue
immediately after the election. While UNIP is reputed to have ignored the
gender issue both in election manifestos and in the campaign, the outgoing
President Kaunda asserted in his televised speech after the elections, that
72 Carer CenterlNDI, op. cit., p. 33.
73 Times of Zambia, 25.10.1991.
74 Weekly Post, 20.9.1991.
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"some mothers did not vote, and the big question we must address
ourselves to is what went wrong? Was there a degree of manpulation or
just coincidence?"75 His query, while not explained and on the surface
surprising, must be based on the pre-election assumption that UNIP and
Kaunda "enjoys popular support among vote-wielding middle-aged women
all over the countr".76
Longwe and Clarke, in a survey commissioned by the authors of this
report, tred to investigate the basis of Kaunda's assertion. Since no
disaggregated voting figures are obtainable in Zambia, analyses of the
voters' register disaggretated by gender (by matching voters registration
numbers with national registration numbers) and a sample survey of
election monitors were employed. Although the results are neccessarly
inconclusive, they indicate that no great discrepancies between male and
female voters as proportions of the electorate seem to exist. Moreover,
Kaunda, when making the assertion could hardly have based it on factual
evidence, let alone information that goes beyond the results produced by
Longwe and Clarke.
The issue Kaunda chose to raise then, merely reflects the expectation of
UNIP to win the votes of middle-aged women, many of whom are amongst
the group of marketeers, who were known to be staunch UNIP supporters.
But marketeers seemed to have left the sinking ship. An observer on the
Copperbelt noted before the election that he assumed many of the
marketeers would "have a UNIP membership card in one pocket, and an
MMD one in the other". Many marketeers seemed to have been UNIP
members by necessity only, in order to keep their business. Recent snap
surveys by the National Mirror and the Times of Zambia seem to confirm
that many of the marketeers were too frightened to vote because their future
position was in jeopardy. Other were possibly afraid to vote for the
opposition and chose not to vote at all.
But not on ly the marketeers were intimidated. As one of the local
election monitors succinctly pointed out: Women are most susceptible to
threats and intimidation since they, more than men, feel responsible for the
safety of their families. The responsible stance often attributed to women,
may on this occasion not have reinforced their readiness to vote but rather
induced them to refrain from doing so. UNIP' s campaign of evoking
images of civil strfe, violence, and threats of retribution may have
backfired and alienated its own electoral base.
75 National Mirror, November 1991.
76 C.K. Tiyoonse in SAPEM, October 1991.
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While in the aftermath it is almost impossible to obtain conclusive
information on many of the issues pertaining to the elections, monitoring
of gender issues in the ongoing democratisation process is not only possible
but all too necessary. The question whether political paries are indeed
committed to the democratic process must also include an assessment as to
whether each political pary was proposing constitutional and legal equality
for women, and whether politicians' statements matched the manifesto
promises on women' s rights.
Concems have already been voiced about the apparent lack of
commitment by the ruling MMD government to ensure the equality of
women as promised in its pre-election manifesto. No woman has been
appointed to a ministerial post, although suitably qualified candidates were
available. Furthermore, in its original draft manifesto the pary clearly
committed itself to the setting up of a Women's Bureau within the
government "intended to provide a solid base for effective and long-lasting
change leading to a more free and equal society".77 The issue dropped out
of the final version of the manifesto, and so far women's delegations to the
President urging the establishment of such a ministry have not received
favourable responses. 78
77 The Movement for Multi-Pary Democracy in Governent, Programme of National
Reconstruction and Development through Democracy (Draft Programme), Lusaka, n.d.,
p.47.
78 See Longwe and Clarke, op.cit.
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4. Election monitoring and observing
The opposition paries had started to demand the presence of international
election observers soon after the election was agreed upon. President
Kaunda at first refused to gi ve in to this demand. However, on 5 February
1991 he was reported to have considered allowing international observers
into the country "if it became necessary", when addressing a gathering of
ambassadors.1 Still, the official acceptance of the presence of international
observers did not come until 15 June 1991, at a well attended UNIP rally
in Lusaka. According to one observer the president felt so moved by the
crowds cheering him, that he "did the unexpected".2
Two days later the Namibian reported Kaunda announcing that "already
former US president Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford have agreed either to
come themselves or send representativ es to the Zambian poii".3 Other
organisations, such as the OAU, the Commonwealth and the UN were
invited.
By then local initiatives were already under way to fill the void created
by the believed absence of internationalobservers by mounting a local
monitoring team. The Zambian Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) was
formed in January 1991. In September 1991 pars of the ZIMT team split
off and formed a second local monitoring team, the Zambian Elections
Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC).
4.1 The formation and infrastruclure of ZIMT
The idea to form a Zambian election monitoring team was conceived in late
1990 by concerned citizens, in direct reaction to President Kaunda's refusal
to allow internationalobservers to monitor the elections. The original
proposal for such a team envisaged the monitoring exercise to last over a
period of roughly one year, covering ample time before and after the actual
elections. The terms of reference included the building of local election
monitoring capacity, and an analytical component, aiming at evaluating the
1 Radio Zambia, 5.1.1991.
2 T.e. Kabwe in SAPEM, September 1991, p. 26.
3 Namibian,17.6.1991.
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process leading up to the elections, the elections themselves, and the
process of transition. As one of the authors of the original proposal
explained, the intention was to use the Zambian elections as a case study
for forthcoming elections in the region. Ths proposal was circulated among
the donors in early 1991 but got no response (see appendices 4 and 5).
According to a Lusaka- based diplomat the proposal was considered to be
too vague and broad in scope.4
The ZIMT core group got under way in April 1991. It was chaired by
Rodger Chongwe, a prominent lawyer and human rights activist. As
chairan of the African Bar Association he had been involved in election
monitoring in Chile, and had become a vocal supporter of the
democratisation process in Zambia. The concept of ZIMT was to attract
prominent, respectable Zambians as board members, who would have
credibility in the eyes of both the ruling party and the opposition paries
and be trusted by the Zambian public. In view of this premise Rodger
Chongwe resigned as chairman of ZIMT and withdrew from the monitoring
exercise once he got involved in MMD pary politics and was later fielded
as an MMD parliamentar candidate. In his stead David Phiri, a former
Govemor of the Bank of Zambia and Embassador to Sweden, was in June
1991 appointed chairman of the ZIMT board. His appointment was strongly
supported by Rodger Chongwe and Z-Vote Executive Secretary Richard
Joseph. According to Z- V ote, David Phiri was "convinced to accept the
ZIMT chairmanship only after Richard Joseph ... met twice in June 1991
with Kaunda to seek assurances that the monitoring effort was sanctioned
and that Kaunda accepted Phiri as a credible chair".5 Also involved in the
set-up of ZIMT were members of a number of NGOs, who served on the
ZIMT board in their individual capacity rather than as representatives of
their respective organisations.
ZIMT was accepted as non-parisan by both major parties and finally
registered as a monitoring team in August 1991. The organisation thereby
gained authorisation from the Electoral Commission to designate individuals
who would be present during the balloting and counting procedures.
A cooperative agreement was drawn up between ZIMT and Z- V ote, the
core of international monitors headed by representatives of the Carer
Center and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
(ND I). The agreement defines the objectives of ZIMT and the areas of
cooperation between ZIMT and Z- V ote as follows: ZIMT is "to promote
4
Personal communication, Siavonga, February 1992.
5 Letter from the Carer Center/NDI to the authors of this report, dated 23 March 1992,
p.5.
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an environment conducive for free multi-pary general elections". It
furthermore "aims to monitor the electoral process and shall ... advance an
opinion as to the fairess of the results which will obtain". The activities
related to this task were defined as encompassing the education of the
Zambian public on their civil rights in relation to elections, to receive
complaints on any infrngement of these rights, to monitor the voting
process, to lobby for the revision of electoral regulations if needed, and to
set up a countr-wide network of volunteers to monitor the election process.
The cooperation of ZIMT and Z- V ote basically related to the supply of
advisory services by Z- V ote to ZIMT, as requested, as well as resource
assistance. The role of Z- V ote in the ZIMT programme was defined as
assisting ZIMT with an infrastructural grant, with the training of ZIMT
volunteers, with the contribution of funds to support civic education, and
finally with the supply of information on how to effectively monitor the
election process.
Despite the apparent care that had been take n in the choice of the
chairman of ZIMT problems and controversies surrounded the monitoring
teams and their cooperation. These concemed both the composition and
efficiency ofZIMT, and the relationship between ZIMT and Z-Vote, which
according to Michael Bratton, a senior adviser to Z-Vote, was "rocky".6
Explanations and interpretations of the causes of the encountered problems
differ widely and are highly controversial. Major differences have by
varous parties been attributed to reservations about the non-partisan
standing of a number of ZIMT board members, doubts about the
operational capacities of ZIMT, frictions over financial arangements
between ZIMT and Z- V ote, and accusations that Z- V ote acted somewhat
patemalistically towards ZIMT. While none of these objections can be
dispelled entirely by either of the teams, there are reasons to believe that
a combination of the above factors contributed to the frictions.
Allegations that ZIMT was biased towards UNIP stared in June 1991
when David Phiri was appointed chairman of ZIMT. The accusation was
directed against Phiri personally. He was by some critics considered
unsuitable as chairman on account of his longstanding frendship with
Kenneth Kaunda. A number of ZIMT board members were also alleged to
have or have had connections with the Special Branch, the security wing
of the Office of the President. The University of Zambia students reacted
strongly to these allegations, or indeed caused them, but they were calmed
down by the original founders of ZIMT who were by then strong MMD
6 Letter of 18 March 1992 by Michael Bratton, appended to the Carer CenterjNDI letter
of 23 March 1992 to the authors of this report.
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supporters. Z- V ote, and paricularly Lary Garber of NDI, were also active
in tring to convince the students, who formed the bulk of local election
monitors, that their suspicions against ZIMT were misplaced, and on the
first Z- Vote training session for monitors in August urged them to continue
working with ZIMT. Allegations against ZIMT did continue, however, and
in ZIMT' s own view the adverse press coverage was felt as a major
liability .7
Parallel to doubts about the impariality of the ZIMT board, allegations
about their operational weakness persisted. Representatives of the Z- V ote
team and members of the diplomatic corps agree that ZIMT did have
organisational difficulties which caused frstration in diplomatic circles as
well as among concerned Zambians. Z- V ote maintains hav ing spent
considerable efforts to "jump start the domestic monitoring effort ... even
be fore funds had been provided to Z- V ote"g by inviting David Phiri to
participate in a pre-election mission to Bulgaria. Z- V ote furthermore c1aims
to have urged ZIMT board members in early August "to hire an executive
director and core staff, to locate and lease office space, and to acquire
equipment".9 Their efforts were, according to Z- V ote, ineffectuaL. When
the first Z-Vote pre-election mission arved in Zambia on 18 August 1991,
no progress seemed to have been made with respect to the establishment of
ZIMT. According to a member of that mission, such board members as had
been invited by the chairperson of ZIMT were uninformed and unaware of
their task, and many had either not been informed or not agreed to serve on
the board.lO ZIMT, however, claims that already in January 1991 verbal
assurances of nine proposed board members had been obtained.11 Z- V ote
also suggests that ZIMT failed to "exploit the considerable enthusiasm"
generated by the first training workshop held by Z-Vote in conjunction with
ZIMT in the latter half of August 1991. Two weeks after the workshop
ZIMT had still not managed to acquire office space and a phone number,
7 ZIMT, Fair Play for a Better Tomorrow, Election Report 1991, Lusaka, Januar 1992,
p.17.
g Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carer Center/NDI (Z-Vote) to the authors of this
report, signed by Richard Joseph and Lary Garber, p. 5.
9 Ibid.
io Personal communication from Mara Leissner, Siavonga, 27 February 1992.
11 ZIMT, Fair Play for a Better Tomorrow, ElectiolÌ Report 1991, Lusaka, Januar 1992,
p. 11.
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both of which necessar to register prospective volunteers for the
monitoring exercise.12
Members of ZIMT explain their operational difficulties, and to some
extent the resulting tension vis-à-vis Z~Vote, in terms of wrangles over
financial matters between the two organsations. Although Z- V ote denied
that such problems existed, there seems liule doubt that, in the words of Z-
V ote advisor Michael Bratton, "financial arangements for the
administration of donor funds became a major source of frction" .13 These
arrangements seem to have been not only vague but also ill defined and
were prone, therefore, to cause misunderstandings. It appears that a large
par of the donor fund ing to ZIMT was initially chanelled via Z- V ote.
ZIMT sources maintained that their early problems to get off the ground
were related to the fact that funds pledged to them both via Z- V ote and
directly were not disbursed in time, and that some of the donors had not
released funds until the date for the elections had been set. The ZIMT
election report states that initially "funds from the donors did not match our
intended activity leveL. Some decisions had to be withheld pending
funding."14 Furthermore, members of the ZIMT board seemed at a fairly
late stage not to have been sure about the amount of donor funds pledged
to ZIMT, and if and when they were to be received. A Lusaka-based
diplomat of a Commonwealth country recalled the lack of information flow
between the various parties involved and noted that in August the ZIMT
board apparently had little idea about the budget available to them.15 The
full trth of the matter seems still far from clear.16
It seems to be accepted that Z-Vote had what Z-Vote itself terms a
"fiduciary responsibility" to the donors with respect to the funds channelled
through Z-Vote but eararked for ZIMT. According to Z-Vote, therefore,
ZIMT was required to produce a budget and a plan of action before the
funds could be released. This requirement had not been fulfilled by early
September, and one may assume, as aresult, that no funds had been
12 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carer Centre/NDI (Z-Vote) to the authors of this
report, p. 3.
13 Letter of 18 March 1992 by Michael Bratton, appended to the Carer Center/NDI letter
of 23 March 1992 to the authors of this report.
14 ZIMT, Fair Play for a Better Tomorrow, Election Report 1991, Lusaka, Januar 1992,
p.15.
15 Personal communication, Februar 1992, Lusaka, name witheld on request.
16 Despite repeated requests to the Carer Center/NDI to supply the authors of this report
with details about the disbursement schedule for funds to ZIMT and details about the
arangements with the donors that contrbuted towards ZIMT's operations, no such
information has been made available.
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released by then.17 Meanwhile the ZIMT offices had been officially
opened on 5 September, one day after the election date had been finally
announced.18 Z- V ote had by then still not released the funds designated
for ZIMT, pending the awaited plan of action. On 21 September ZIMT
presented Z-Vote wìth a "Memorandum of Agreement,,19, which according
to Z- V ote "embarassed even Phiri because it did not include what had
been agreed upon,,20 and which others caU "ill-tempered". The
memorandum, which was never signed by Z- V ote, refers to the financial
confusion: "We are concerned that you had set out a programme and
budget on our behalf without consultation and at the same time you are
asking us to accept your terms without discussion or clarfication." Finally
the memorandum calls for a mutually agreeable accounting and audit
system for the resources provided by the donor community to ZIMT via Z-
V ote and a disbursement schedule "setting out all the sums of funds made
available by donors to ZIMT through Z-Vote".21
Controversies about the release of funds also reached the press. A/rica
South reported that "Z- V ote has failed to release the purse strings, because
ZIMT has not come up with any project plan of how they expect to spend
the money allocated to them".22 When these controversial funds were
actually disbursed to ZIMT has remained a mystery to the authors of this
report. According to an earlier statement by Z- V ote, provisional plans to
transfer all ZIMT -designated funds to ZIMT were made in late September,
but in a later statement Z- V ote declares never having disbursed any donor
funds to ZIMT, and that on the behest of three unidentified donors "z.. V ote
retumed the pro-rata share of the amount that had been appropriated in the
Z- V ote budget for direct support of the local monitoring group,,23 (see also
section 4.4).
Apar from financial uncertainties the ZIMT memorandum points to the
second source of friction between ZIMT and Z- V ote. It refers to the
confusion surrounding the role of Z- V ote in the monitoring exercise: "W e
17 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carer Center/NDI to the authors of this report, p. 6.
18 Times of Zambia, 6 September 1991.
19 Memorandum of Agreement between ZIMT and Z-Vote, letter by David Phiri to Richard
Joseph, 21 September 1991.
20 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carter Center/NDI to the authors of this report, p. 6.
21 ZIMT, Memorandum of Agreement, op. cit.
22 Africa South, October 1991
23 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carer Center/NDI to the authors of this report, p. 6;
and Memorandum from Lar Garber and Richard Joseph to Arne Tostensen, dated 6
May 1992, p. 2.
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feel that it is absolutely necessar that your organisation's role as observers
is not seen as usurping the rights of Zambians to monitor their own
elections." ZIMT further requested Z- V ote not to discuss the ZIMT board
with third paries without prior consultation with ZIMT, as this was felt to
have given rise to doubts being cast "on the credibility of members of
ZIMT as a group".24
The memorandum also mentions ZIMT' s impression that Z- V ote
"considers that local monitoring capabilities are inadequate for the tasks
ahead".25 Feelings were prevalent withn ZIMT that Z-Vote had assumed
too much of a "paternalistic" attitude towards the operations of ZIMT and
had been overrding ZIMT's own decision-makng processes. The authors
of this report heard numerous complaints by ZIMT members that Z- V ote
had consulted them insufficiently and had come into the country with
preconceived ideas about how to do things, and having disregarded
Zambian expertise. Such sentiments, which have been confirmed by a
number of individuals outside ZIMT, might well be a reaction against
accusations of incompetence and inerti a, but could also be considered
relevant and in some measure justified in their own right.
The apparent operational difficulties of ZIMT might not only be
attributable to, as a member of the Z- V ote team chose to phrase it, their
being "both administratively incompetent and unwilling to accept technical
assistance,,26 but also to factors extemal to ZIMT. The bulk of donor
funds to ZIMT, for example, seems indeed to have been released only after
the date of elections had been set (see also section 4.4).
ZIMT's delay in obtaining an operational telephone, which seems to have
incensed Z- V ote, might also be due to the fact that ZIMT, with the help of
Z- V ote, had leased the former office premises of the Afrcan National
Congress of South Africa in exile, which had left a large unpaid phon e bill
on their deparure, thus causing an embargo on that office phone. Z- V ote
had to intervene to unblock the impasse.
The delays in hiring an executive director for ZIMT seems also to have
contributed to accusations of ZIMT' s incompetence. According to Z- V ote
ZIMT failed to get in touch with the Zambian lawyer based in Oxford
(Chaloka Beyani), whom Rodger Chongwe had designated for the position,
and finally didso only when prompted by Z-Vote.27 According to others
24 ZIMT, Memorandum of Agreement, op. cit.
25 Ibid.
26 Letter of 18 March 1992 by Michael Bratton, p. 6, which was appended to the Carter
Center/NDI letter of 23 March 1992 to the authors of this report.
27 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carter Center/NDI to the authors of this report, p. 5.
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the delays were also caused by divergent opinions about the stipulated
salar level and other costs involved,28 and possibly by indecision on the
par of the lawyer himself.29
A more serious point raised in the ZIMT memorandum is, however, the
implicit assumption that Z- V ote had contributed to casting ~'doubts on the
credibility of members of ZIMT as a group". This serious implication and
ZIMT' s request that Z- V ote refrain from discussing ZIMT with third
paries, can only be seen in the context of the developments between the
time of the establishment of ZIMT offices and the presentation of the
memorandum.
4.2 The emergence of ZEMCC
Allegations of UNIP infiltration into ZIMT and accusations about
incompetence on the part of ZIMT were made with increasing frequency
during August and September. Frustration mounted not only among
members of Z- V ote and the donor community but also amongst concerned
Zambians. Doubts about ZIMT's credibility affected all ZIMT board
members. On 17 September representativ es of Zambia's church
organisations met and decided to form their own monitoring group, the
Christian Churches' Monitoring Group (CCMG). With its formation the
three church members who had served on the ZIMT Board in their
individual capacity withdrew and joined the new organisation. The reasons
given were questions about the objectivity and independence of ZIMT, and
the lack of a detailed plan of action. The churches felt also that they would
have more authority as organisations rather than as individuals.30 The new
organisation was officially launched on 20 September 1991, one day prior
to ZIMT' s presentation of the controversial memorandum.
The CCMG was soonjoined by a number of other NGOs, some ofwhose
prominent members had served on the ZIMT board or supported ZIMT
otherwise in individual capacities, such as the Students' Union, the Press
Association, the Law Association, and the National Women's Lobby Group.
Other powerful pressure groups such as the Commercial Farers' Bureau
28 Minutes from the ZIMT Board Meeting on 26 August 1991 record that a Z-Vote
representative present at the meeting raised concerns about the need to recruit a lawyer
from England on account of travel and relocation costs involved.
29 Personal communication from both ZIMT members and representativ 
es of the donor
community, Lusaka, October 1991 and February 1992.
30 ZEMCC, Setting a standardfor Africa: Free and Fair Elections. Final Report. Lusaka,
November 1991, p. 2 ff.
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and the Truckers' Association offered their support. The new umbrella
organisation of major NGOs was registered on 27 September 1991, merely
5 weeks before election day, under the name of Zambia Elections
Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC) and under the chairmanship
of Reverend Foston Sakala.
Following the registration of ZEMCC the Weekly Post reported that
ZIMT "which has just been disbanded and replaced by ZEMCC had in
partcular come under fire from varous pressure groups and political paries
as unfit in its composition to achieve the desired goal".31 According to
ZIMT, ZEMCC officials had declared ZIMT dissolved during a 17
September press conference "as if ZIMT was its creation or indeed that of
ZEMCC's constituent organisations".32 And Laurah Harson, chairperson
of the National Women's Lobby Group is reported to have declared that:
"W e cannot work together with ZIMT because we do not know what they
stand for. 
,,33 Under these circumstances it was hardly surprising that
ZIMT, which did not disband, dec1ined the invitation of ZEMCC,
apparently at Z~Vote's behest,34 to join as one of its constituent members.
In early October ZEMCC held its first public workshop at the University
of Zambia, where it introduced itself to the public and to the donor
community. The response was overwhelming, and A/rica Confdential felt
it justified to report a week later that ZEMCC was favoured as the more
trustworthy local monitoring team by Z- V ote and a number of donors.35
ZIMT felt that "the split also affected the dose relationship that existed
between Z-Vote and ZIMT, with the former opting to work with
ZEMCC".36
Z- V ote strongly denies such suggestions. Its representativ es maintain that
they "insisted that ZIMT should not be summarily dismissed as an entity"
and that "Richard Joseph was accused at some point of defending and
protecting ZIMT".37 When such efforts failed they claim to have "played
a key role, together with the diplomatic community, in ensuring some
31
Weekly Post, 27 September 1991.
32 ZIMT, Fair Play for a Better Tomorrow, Election Report 1991, Lusaka, Januar 1992,
p.17.
33
Weekly Post, 20 September 1991.
34 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carter Center/NDI to the authors of this report, p. 6.
35 Africa Confidential, 11 October 1991.
36 ZIMT, Fair Play for a Better Tomorrow, Election Report 1991, Lusaka, January 1992,
p.18.
37 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carer Center/NDI to the authors of this report, p. 6.
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degree of cooperation between the groups in the period preceding the
elections".38
The split of the local monitoring teams did, however, continue to give
scope for controversies and allegations, not only amongst its members, but
also amongst Zambian citizens and the donor community (see also section
4.4). A week after the successful ZEMCC workshop and a day after the
Scandinavian countries presented ZIMT with their funds, the Times of
Zambia reported that University of Zambia students had called for the
dissolution of ZIMT and that ZEMCC "has expressed surprise at the
continued aid from the Canadian government to the dismantled ZIMT". The
aricle goes on to quote ZEMCC board member Mutale, who had
previously been serving on the ZIMT board, as having said in Ndola that
"ZIMT had been totally rejected by Zambians" and that 44assistance must
be given to meet the aspirations of the people of Zambia".39
Jf ZIMT had blamed their initial operational difficulties on belated
disbursal of funds, ZEMCC proved that organisation was possible with very
limited funds. The ZEMCC monitoring organisation moved ahead with
astonishing speed and success. Using the infrastructure of the churches,
their transport and communication network, ZEMCC managed to register
and train volunteers in a short period of time. Mobile training units,
covering all the provinces did the rest. it soon became evident that ZEMCC
had few difficulties in fulfilling its aim of having a trained monitor at
virtually every polling station in Zambia. Bishop John Mambo, ZEMCC's
public relations man, declared one day before the elections that ZEMCC
was "the only monitoring group with monitors throughout Zambia".40
ZEMCC's appeal and success was very much based on the fact that
theirs was a broad-based organisation, which was able to use the highly
efficient and trusted grassroots infrastructure of the churches to pursue their
aims. Their efficiency and commitment despite limited funds initially,
which in the eyes of Z- V ote was '4refreshing"41 (presumably compared to
ZIMT), also added to their appeal and success. Therefore, ZEMCC emerged
forcefully as the more people-oriented monitoring group, and the
prominence of the churches among its constituent member organisations
helped preempt serious accusations of partiality. Since ZEMCC was also
able to represent the churches as a body, it had the scope, authority, and
more importantly the legitimacy to appeal for peace and reconciliation. The
38 Ibid.
39 Times of Zambia, 10 October 1991.
40 Times of Zambia, 30 October 1991
41 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carter CenterjNDI to the authors of this report, p. 6.
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leaders of ZEMCC were highly successful in easing the tensions between
the two main contending political parties and continued to try and arange
a second meeting between Kaunda and Chiluba until the very last day
before the elections.
After the withdrawal from ZIMT of the churches and other NGOs ZIMT,
with its somewhat eroded popular support base, turned into an urban-based
organisation of eminent, high ranking Zambian citizens. The formation of
ZEMCC has been interpreted as a reaction to the top-down organisational
strcture of ZIMT and the somewhat "undemocratic" nature of the
appointment of individuals to its bo ard. A number of critics of ZIMT,
representativ es of Z-Vote included, now believe that ZIMT's initial
organisational difficulties were due to its strcture, rather than belated
funding.42 Some go even further to sugge st that ZIMT was indeed over-
funded.43 Jf the church-dominated ZEMCC did command popular support
and did have the au thori t y and legitimacy to call for peace, ZIMT with its
"hand-picked" board of professional Zambian citizens did command
expertise, which came to bear in the efficient and professional handling of
legal complaints of both paries and individuals by its Legal and Security
Committee, in its civic education programme, in its efforts at proposing
changes in the electoral procedures, and in its involvement in the Z- Vote
coordinated paralleI vote tabulation.
It is somewhat unfortunate and sad that differences and competition
between the two local monitoring teams prevailed over the realisation of
united complementary strength. However, the two monitoring teams did
eventually meet in the immediate pre-election period and established a joint
working group to coordinate their monitoring efforts during the elections.
The rift between them, nonetheless, outlasted their joint success on election
day.
4.3 The position of parties
Democratic forces in Zambia had called for the presence of international
observers and had initiated the formation of local election monitoring
teams. The Kaunda government had eventually agreed to national and
international monitoring, but it emerged that the consent was given
grudgingly and only partially .
42 Ibid., p. 10.
43 Personal communication from member of the donor community who wishes to remain
anonymous.
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The different values attached to the monitoring exercise by the
government and UNIP, on the one hand, and the opposition pares and the
Zambian public, on the other, was very apparent even in the day-to-day
work of the authors of this report. We found it more difficult to get
interviews with UNIP and government officials, but were treated with
utmost courtesy by MMD candidates and staff. At MMD rallies
internationalobservers were ushered to a place on the trbune, and an
emphatic and war welcome marked the beginnng of speeches. This
attitude also marked the majority of the Zambian population. When wearng
the official tag of an international observer, one was of ten stopped and
thanked on the streets and people volunteered their opinions and grievances
about the election campaign.
It was very clear that the election observers were seen by the majority as
representativ es of democratic ideals who had come to make sure that UNIP
would not rig the elections. This perception, while it is almost logical,
created, however, a number of problems. One of the board members of
ZIMT made a valid point when she suggested that true non-partisanship
was almost impossible in Zambia at that moment: People who were
identifying with the democratic. process and were willing to ensure its
validity during the elections, were almost automatically identifying with the
main opposition party. This fe eling was particularly strong since that party
had started off as a popular democratic movement.
A major par of this dilemma, and the fact that it was UNIP, not MMD,
that had a record of rigging and, moreover, had the machinery at hand to
attempt it, meant necessarily that election monitoring was perceived to be
synonymous with watching UNIP. The fervour with which allegations
against ZIMT were treated must also be understood in these terms.
Accusations from UNIP that ZEMCC was infiltrated by MMD never had
the effect of discrediting ZEMCC's ability to monitor the elections. Nor
had the suggestion that members of ZEMCC's board were outspoken MMD
supporters any bearing on the group's credibility. It did, in fact, rather help
establish their credibility.
President Kaunda and the UNIP government certainly reacted to national
and internationalobservers with the defiance of the accused. After the Z-
V ote team had sent their first pre-election missions to Zambia in August
and again in September with former US President Jimmy Carer himself as
its head, and issued their first concerns about the conduct of the election
campaign, President Kaunda put his foot down.44 Under the heading
44 According to an Africa Confdential (11.10.1991) report Kaunda's "prickly response" to
the Carer teams was sparked off "when a member of the Carer team asked a UNIP
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"MeddIers Out", the Times of Zambia reported that President Kaunda had
declared that internationalobservers had no mandate to interfere in
domestic politics and "dismissed recommendations made by former US
President Mr J. Carer and his team as alien to the Zambian situation".45
And the Zambia Daily M ail on the same day quoted the then Minister of
Mines, Mulondwe Muzungu: "They (the observers) give the impression that
they are not here to observe but to dictate to us what should be done as if
we do not have election procedures." He added that "the country had held
elections since independence and at no time did any one complain that the
elections were rigged".46
The Ndola political secretary of UNIP expressed a similar line of
argument, when he told authors of this report that international observers
assumed Zambia was America. Referrng to the suggestion of the Carer
Team, that votes be counted at the polling stations, he declared that "one
can't count in the dark". Supplying polling stations with paraffin lamps as
was sugge sted by the team, moreover, was in his min d surely an act of
wastefulness out to destroy the Zambian economy.47
What had evidently upset UNIP and the government most at this point
was clearly a misunderstanding. The monitoring teams, Carter included,
suggested starting a campaign aimed at educating the electorate on how to
vote.48 UNIP read this suspiciously to mean telling the people what party
to vote for, rather than informing them about their constitutional rights. The
misunderstanding was later cleared up, but the suspicion lingered.
The final UNIP blow against the monitoring teams came on 25 October,
when the Government- and UNIP-owned papers repeatedly printed a full-
page advertisement, published by the Public Relations Unit of UNIP, which
alleged that the monitoring teams were plotting to remove the UNIP
government. Under the heading "How non-partisan are the Zambia Election
Monitoring Groups?" the advertisement stated that the groups that make up
ZEMCC have been proven to be hostile to UNIP: Pars of the church had
openly express ed their anti-UNIP stand; the Law Association had openly
declared their support for MMD, the Press Association had shown their
hostility to UNIP by filing a court injunction against heads of the state
owned media (see section 3.3), the leader of the Students Union was known
representative why he had chosen to stay with the ruling pary instead of joining the
opposition MMD".
45 Times of Zambia, 1.10.1991.
46 Zambia Daily Mai!, 1.10.1991.
47 Interview, Ndola, 29.10.1991.
48 Times of Zambia, 1.10.1991.
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to be an MMD member, and the National Women's Lobby Group had not
only MMD members on its membership, but also MMD parliamentary
candidates. In the same vein ZIMT was accused of being the brainchild of
an MMD parliamentar candidate, who had put forward the name of its
present chairman.49 The fact that this very same chairman was accused by
other quarers of being biased towards UNIP did not stop the argument
being advanced.
What was judged to be even more frghtening and outrageous, however,
were accusations levelled against the international observer teams and the
US in particular. The National Women's Lobby Group, so the
advertisement suggested, was sponsÇ)red by the US, because "the UNIP
leadership has been targeted for removal".50 Alleging that the monitoring
teams were involved in a "big imperialist plot against the countr" the
advertisement went on to say that "the so-called observer groups are in
ac tu al fact not election monitors, their assignment is to facilitate the
removal of the UNIP Government and replace it with a puppet one like had
happened in many parts of the world". With the backing of the international
observers the imperialist plot was to use local observers to influence the
election in favour of MMD such as dec1aring the elections rigged when
UNIP wins.51
On the same day the UNIP paper, Eagle Express, carred a similar
advertisement which in addition to the above accusations demanded that
monitoring teams should not engage in civic education, vote counting and,
most astonishingly, vote monitoring. Instead they "must undress itself(sic!)
of any political bias otherwise we shall accuse them of election rigging".52
In the following days the advertisements were strongly condemned by
both national and international observer teams and their diplomatic
representations. The US Embassy, for example, strongly protested its
alleged role in using local groups to destabilise UNIP. The US Embassy
was also surprised that ZIMT, identified publicly by the Foreign Affairs
Minister as the appropriate point of contact for foreign observers coming
to Zambia, was now in UNIP' s line of fire. 
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Following the protests, Kenneth Kaunda apologised publicly for "the
offensive UNIP advertisement", and declared that it was not a reflection of
49 Times of Zambia, 25.10.1991.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52
Eagle Express, 25.10.1991.
53 Times of Zambia, 29.10.1991.
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government views.54 He stressed that internationalobservers were
welcome in Zambia, but again objected to observers who "wanted to do
things which could not be implemented under the Zambian law".55
As it were, none of the accusations against national or international
observers were voiced after the elections had been declared fair and free.
During the election monitoring exercise, however, some local monitors
reported to have been prevented from "actively interfering" at the polling
stations. These cases, however, were exceptions.
4.4 Supporting democratic elections: The role of the donor
community
Funds for the Zambian election process was contrbuted by the governments
of the four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden),
Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, Canada and Great Britain.
The beneficiaries included the monitoring teams - both international and
national- and the Zambian Electoral Commission, which was desperately
short of funds and election materials.
Support of the Electoral Commission was probably most straightforward.
Funds were to be used for election materials, such as ballot boxes and the
printing of ballot papers etc. Contributions were substantial and in many
cases the largest single budgetary item of election support. Norway and
Sweden, for example, contributed NOK/SEK 1.5 million each, Denmark
DKK 1 million, Finland FIM 400,000.
Z- V ote received possibly the largest share of the election support from
all Nordìc countries, as well as Germany, the Netherlands and the United
States and indirect support from Canada and Great Britain. The Nordìc
countres alone appear to have contributed some US$ 900,000 to the
operations of Z-Vote alone.56 Contrbutions to other international
monitoring teams, such as the Commonwealth Team, or international
country delegations who operated both under the auspìces of Z- V ote and
independently were funded either by their governments or other donors
directl y .
As already indicated (see sections 4.1 and 4.2 above) funding of the local
monitoring teams ZIMT and later ZEMCC has been controversial and
54 Times of Zambia, 30.10.1991.
55 Zambia Daily Mail, 30.10.1991.
56 Contributions were split between the Nordie countries thus: Finland FIM 200,00;
Denmark DKK 1 milion; Norway NOK 1.7 milion; and Sweden SEK 2.4 milion.
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difficult both in terms of modalities and timing. Although the finer details
have remained patchy to the authors of this report,57 indications would
have it, that both the conflicts between Z-Vote and ZIMT, Z-Vote's mode
of operation, the emergence of ZEMCC, and ultimately the reactions of the
donor community contrbuted to the controversial nature of the funding.
The modalities of funding have apparently be en quite different for the
respective donors. Some made grants available directly to the beneficiares,
others initially channelled their contrbutions through Z- V ote, each
stipulating their own conditions. According to Z- V ote "some of the donors
did not wish any of their contributions to go to ZEMCC, others approved
paral use of their funds for ZEMCC and still others gave Z- V ote full lee-
way touse the money designated for local monitors as they saw fit".58
Furthermore, agreements between donors and Z- Vote seemed to have been
subjected to considerable change as time passed by.
According to the Carter Center/NDI sources unidentified donors had
already in July 1991 "allocated the sum ofUS$ 319,000, funnelled through
Z- V ote, for ZIMT' s direct use, and an additional $100,00 for Z- V ote
training programs".59 Minutes of a ZIMT board meeting on 2 September
1992, suggest that ZIMT was "concerned with the role of Z- V ote in
securìng and administration (sic!) of funds likely to be given to ZIMT"
when the representative of Z- V ote at that meeting announced that Z- V ote
would be the channel for all available donor funds to be extended to ZIMT.
The minutes record that the chairman thereupon "clarfied the position and
expressly stated that ZIMT funding specifically to be channelled directly"
to the trust account designated by ZIMT.60 On the next day, apparently
in respons e to Phiri's clarification, the then Z-Vote Project Director, Karen
Jenkins, wrote to ZIMT that: "According to the proposal submitted by the
Carer Center and NDI, and under which the funds were pledged to the Z-
V ote project by donors, the Carter Center and NDI are responsible for
disbursing all funds except for (Canada, Great Britain, and Denmark) and
will be accountable for all the money expended on the entire project
57 Strenuous efforts have been made to obtain details of financial arangements from both
the major donors and from the Carer Center/NDI, but not always successfully, either
because documents containing such details were dec1ared restrcted, contact could not
be made, or responses were not forthcoming. The account here rely on elements of such
information that was made available by a number of paries. Unfortunately, the
discussion is, therefore, incomplete.
58 Letter of i 8 March 1992 by Michael Bratton, which was appended to the Carter
Center/NDI letter of 23 March 1992 to the authors of this report.
59 Letter of 23 March 1992 from the Carter Center/NDI to the authors of this report, p. 4.
60 ZIMT, Minutes of the ZIMT Board Meeting, 2 September 1991.
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inc1uding all disbursements to ZIMT. ,,61 In view of the fact that Z- V ote
apparently encouraged their role as trustees of ZIMT vis-à-vis the donors,
it is interesting to examine why their fiduciar responsibility towards ZIMT
was evidently withdrawn subsequently by the majority of the donors.
Funds from the three governents that did circumvent Z- V ote were the
first to reach ZIMT. One of the earlier contrbutions made available to
ZIMT came from the Canadian government, which had out of internal
reasons opted to fund ZIMT directly with C$ 50,000 in cash and kind.62
The contract, signed on 22 August 1991 stipulated the immediate use. of
funds. In a letter from Z- V ote to ZIMT, dated 3 September 1991, Z- V ote
indicates that the Canadian governent had deposited a K 1.2 million cash
share into the ZIMT account.63 This is confired by the minutes of a
ZIMT Board meeting a day later, which mention the above amount as the
only money received, and suggest that at that point no further written
pledges had been received from the donors.64 A further direct contrbution
to ZIMT in cash and kind amounting to £ 10,000 was made available by
the British Government shortly afterwards. A newspaper article also quotes
Phiri as having announced that Denmark "had donated K 1 million which
was being used to rent office accommodation". 65 It is confirmed by other
sources that Denmark did hand over a cheque to ZIMT to cover 6 months'
rent for the ZIMT offices.66 The balance of pledged Danish funds, together
with those of Norway and Sweden, which were initially to be channelled
through Z-Vote, were finally made available to ZIMT in October 1991.
On 9 October 1991 a ceremony was held at the premises of ZIMT
headquarers to mark the signing of the agreements on the Danish,
Norwegian and Swedish contributions to ZIMT which amounted to more
than US$ 200,000 and constituted a large share of total donor support to
ZIMT. Finland drew up a separate agreement with ZIMT to the amount of
FIM 50,000 which was signed and took effect on 28 October 1991 - three
days before the elections.
61 Z-Vote letter to David Phiri of ZIMT, date 
d 3 September 1991.
62 The money for ZIMT was drawn from a Canadian fund designated for projects proposed
by non-governental organsations for development activities. Therefore, it had to be
provided to a Zambian organsation rather than a foreign-based one, such as Z-Vote.
63 Z-Vote letter to David Phiri of ZIMT, date d 3 September 1991.
64 Minutes of the ZIMT Board Meeting held on 4 September 1991.
65 Ibid.
66 See Z- V ote letter to David Phiri of ZIMT, dated 3 September 1991; and Minutes of the
ZIMT Board Meeting, 4 September 1991.
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IThe Swedish government had on 13 August 1991 signed an agreement
with the Carer Center to the tune of SEK 3 million to be used for election
monitoring. The agreement specifies that the Swedish contrbution was to
be shared by the Carer Center, NID and ZIMT "as the CC finds suitable".
The Carer Center, moreover, was made responsible for all planning,
coordination, follow-up as well as financial and narative reporting. The
disbursement of funds to the Carer Center was made conditional upon the
formal announcement of the election date by the Zambian government.
Interestingly SIDA also reserved the right to "reconsider or even withdraw
support" should "significant changes or problems" arse.67 As it were, the
Swedish government subsequently invoked this escape clause, and drew up
a separate agreement with ZIMT. Signed on 9 October 1991 it made
available SEK 600,000 to ZIMT directly, to be transferred to the ZIMT
account on the date of signing. Presumably this agreement superseded the
earlier one with the Carter Center.68
The Norwegian governent had with effect from 16 August 1991 signed
an agreement with the Carter Center/NDI covering NOK 2 million and
giving that organisation the responsibility to disburse a share to ZIMT. At
a later date, and after the emergence of ZEMCC, the Norwegian
government decided with the Carer Center to make available to ZIMT the
specified amount of NOK 200,000 and at the same time authorise the
Carer Center to support ZEMCC with a similar amount.
There is little doubt that the emergence of ZEMCC during September
1991 was one of the major reasons for the contractual changes of earlier
agreements between the various donors and Z-Vote. The donor community,
which had initially chosen to support ZIMT as the sole local monitoring
group was now faced not only with mounting allegations about the
unsuitability of ZIMT and growing frustrations over ZIMT's lack of
efficiency, but also with new decisions on how to relate to ZEMCC. The
donor community was split over the issue and conflicts abounded. The
existence of such conflicts are clearly reflected in the speech of the
Swedish Ambassador to Zambia, Per Taxell, at the 9 October ceremony,
when he was reported to have expressed "that it was not appropriate for the
donors to be seen taking sides".69 His criticism, it seems, was mainly
directed at those who had taken the li bert y to discredit ZIMT, since on the
67 Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), Agreement on Swedish
contrbution to the Carter Center, 13 August 1991. Emphasis added.
68 Swedish Embassy Lusaka, Agreement on Swedish Contribution to the Zambian
Independent Monitoring Team, 9 October 1991.
69 Times of Zambia, 10.10.1991.
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same occasion he expressed "a sincere hope that the time of incrìmination
and mudslinging on the par of certain national monitoring groups will
cease" and make way for more productivity and cooperation.70
The Swedish ambassador had indeed been one of the most active and
outspoken countr representatives in his attempts to mediate between ZIMT
and Z-Vote and later in tring to reconcile ZIMT and ZEMCC. His
government did, however, also take sides, and vocally supported ZIMT as
the more impartial local monitoring team. Denmark took the same stand,
and explicitly supported ZIMT only, suggesting that ZEMCC was not
considered impariaL.71 Norway, as already mentioned, renegotiated its
contract to provide equal contrbutions to ZIMT and ZEMCC. Finland also
supported both organisations with equal amounts and did so directly. The
German government, on the other hand, supported only ZEMCC via Z- V ote
almost at the last minute, covering the cost of charered planes to distrbute
credentials to ZEMCC monitors countrwide.72
The conflicts and the discord among the donors involved in funding
Zambian elections monitoring efforts are now in retrospect recalled by
individuals of the diplomatic community as unfortunate and inappropriate.
One participant in the proceedings characterised the reactions of the donors
as "hysterical" and too involved. Another believes that the conflicts
between the monitoring teams threw some representativ es of the donors off
balance and opened up to them a new arena of opinionative politicking,
hitherto unknown in Zambia. Whatever the reasons, the outcome was far
from intended. The agreed choice of the donors had initially been to
support the Carer Center/NDI, mainly because it represented a presumably
imparial third party of international standing, legitimacy and credibility.
Pledging funds via the Carter Center as a conduit promised to keep the
direct involvement of the donors to a minimum, and, moreover, promised
to ensure that the donors were absolved from having to take sides or to
make judgements about the suitability of local monitors.
As it tumed out these laudable intentions proved unrealistic. Most likely
the reasons lie with the doubts raised about the suitability of ZIMT, and in
their wake doubts about the operations of Z-Vote. It seems to the authors
of this report that many of the inherent conflicts were, as the election date
70 Statement by the Swedish Ambassador at the Signing of the Agreements on the Danish,
Norwegian and Swedish Contributions to the Zambian Independent Monitoring Team,
October 9, 1991.
71 Information provided by the Danish Embassy in Lusaka, telex of 5 December 1991.
72 Embassy of the Federal Republie of Germany in Lusaka, letter to the authors of this
report, 22 May 1992.
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drew c1oser, mutually reinforced by all those involved in the operation, Z-
Vote, local monitoring teams, the Zambian public and not least the donors
themselves. That this was allowed to happ en seems to some degree to be
due to the fact that the majority of the donors chose to delegate to Z~Vote
the difficult task of disbursing to the Zambian monitors sums of money
which were often not broken down by beneficiar and extended under
unspecified terms. In fulfilling its fiduciar responsibility vis-à~vis the
donors Z- V ote then established what, at least in its own assessment, seemed
reasonable conditionalities for disbursement. But of course serious delays
resulted, particularly in the case of ZIMT, which might well have
contributed to ZIMT's operational difficulties. The fact that at least three
donors, Sweden being among them, chose to request Z- V ote to return
ZIMT -designated funds to them for direct disbursal seems to confirm that
dissatisfaction with Z- V ote' s handling of ZIMT funds did exist on the par
of some donors.
The availability of foreign aid towards election monitoring seems to have
become not only subject to political speculation and guessing but also to
the rumour mongering that characterised the pre-election periode The initial
concentration of funds in the hands of one organisation, Z- V ote, seems to
have exacerbated inherent tensions as much as did the initial choice of the
donors to avoid direct involvement by refraining from giving specific and
unambiguous instructions to Z- V ote.
4.5 Implications for election monitoring
Although the setting up of the election monitoring teams and cooperation
between them was riddled with difficulties, the Zambian election
monitoring and observation exercise was a triumphant success, which
indeed set a standard for Africa.
The authors of this report strongly believe that it was the interplay
between both national monitors and internationalobservers and monitors
that enlisted, in a situation like that obtaining in Zambia, the confidence of
the voters in the fairness of the election and gave them security as voters.
As such election monitoring and observation as a whole made an invaluable
contribution towards the promotion of a peaceful democratic change of
government.
In the run-up to the elections internationalobservers and monitors, and
particularly the Carer Center/NDI team, were instrumental in pressing for
changes and modifications in the election campaign and the electoral
process. Their recognised authority and international reputation and their
status as disinterested outsiders made them invaluable spokespersons for the
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democratic elements of Zambian society. The fact that even they
immediately faced scepticism or even hostility by the incumbent
government is but one indicator of the difficulties local monitoring teams
would have had to overcome in pursuing these aims on their own,
pariculary in view of the fact that the then government only hesitantly
agreed to the monitorìng of the elections. An international presence was,
therefore, undoubtedly necessary.
The reassurance that the actual elections had indeed proceeded in a free
and fair manner did largely rest, however, with the local monitors. It was
they who were present in virtually each and every polling station over the
whole period of the electoral process - the polling, the mo ving of polling
boxes, and the counting. The local monitors were, therefore, the ultimate
reference point for the final judgement of international observers. Outsiders
could not have established such a complete surveillance system, if only due
to the sheer number of people required, let alone the insights into local
conditions needed.
But the impact of the local monitors reaches beyond election day. While
the internationalobservers have moved out after the elections, thousands of
local monitors remain and now form a core of Zambian citizens who have
not only experienced democracy by voting but also committed themselves
to safeguarding that democratic right for others in the future. Many will
without doubt make valuable contributions towards the deepening of the
democratic process in the future.
However, successful election monitoring and observation can, and the
Zambian context has made this clear, be fraught with problems. They relate
mainly to the fact that the impartiality required of an election observer is
very hard to de fine in a situation where an undemocratic government is
challenged through democratic elections. Concerned citizens who are
willing to ensure the democratic principles are upheld during such an
election (Le. prospective monitors) tend almost by definition to be biased
towards the democratic forces that challenge the undemocratic government.
In Zambia this was paricularly clear'-cut, since the main opposition party
had in fact grown out of a broad popular movement for democracy.
Such a situation necessarily creates suspicion and confusion. Impariality
and the meaning it assumed in the Zambian context at that particular point
in time was a major issue affecting the local monitoring teams. At the time
a slight bias towards MMD was clearly considered by many as more
compatible with non-parisanship than was a corresponding bias towards
UNIP, which was identified - again at that particular juncture - as
tantamount to upholding undemocratic principles. The fact that UNIP in
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many ways had never exhibited any real commitment to democracy in the
period preceding the elections, heightened the conflict.
The inevitable element of suspicion and mistr st will always affect local
monitoring teams and their individual members much stronger then it will
internationalobservers. Establishing a team that satisfies the contending
paries and the electorate is, therefore, bound to be a highly contentious
issue. It is also bound to be a matter of precarous balance, paricularly with
reg ard to choosing members that are known to be democratically minded
persons without too strong aleaning towards the opposition, lest they not
be acceptable to the government in power. It is in such a situation almost
impossible to satisfy the aspirations of all groups and individuals
concerned.
Keeping this in mind, the authors of this report believe that involved
outsiders should recognise that these problems are inherently related to a
nascent democracy. Given the large security apparatus that is of ten part of
on e-p ar Y , authoritarian state strctures, it is, in fact, almost impossible to
preclude any involvement of undemocratically minded individuals. As a
result, anybody is potentially "dangerous". However, basic principles of
monitoring do exist, such as the requirement that a monitor should not be
actively involved in pary politics or indeed be a candidate for a contending
pary and should in his/her capacity refrain from publicly favouring any one
pary. These principles alone should be applied in judging the suitability of
any monitor. Outside this framework foreign observers should by all means
avoid making hast y - and possibly wrong - judgements. One would
assume that internationalobservers would strongly protest if local monitors
would make rash judgements about the democratic inclinations of
internationalobservers and be ready to disqualify som e of them.
Such sentiments were also voiced by the chairan of ZEMCC, whose
group had called the impariality of ZIMT into question. In an interview
just before the election he strongly opposed the active involvement of
donors in the democratisation process. He believed that at present
democracy had a different meaning and value for Africans, who had to
grapple with the fact that a supporter of a different pary is not
automatically an enemy you want to destroy . Foreign donors should,
therefore, be careful not to interfere - they should rather keep strctly to
their roleas observers and, if need be, offer their ideas of a democratic
process.73
In the Zambian case, some of the internationalobservers and donors did,
however, make such judgements and took sides with regard to their
73 Interview with Rev. F. Sakala, Lusaka, 29.10.1991.
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